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In the past months, the preservation of our environment has become an important 
issue on the public agenda. The impact of the film “An Inconvenient truth” (Guggenheim, 
2006), depicting the imminent dangers associated with our careless management of natural 
resources, should not be underestimated in this respect. Its immediate impact has been 
impressive, evidenced, for example, by the actions of a Belgian housewife, who organized a 
screening of the movie attended by a large number of Belgian politicians. The release of the 
film was followed by a vast increase of news items covering climate change and other 
environmental topics in the media. Soon, however, a second wave of responses emerged. 
Some accused the messenger, Al Gore, of being partisan, having (financial and professional) 
ulterior motives and not presenting his facts right. Irrespective of whether these allegations 
are true, such reactions were to be expected. Psychological motives for such a backlash will be 
discussed later. For now it suffices to observe that people seem to be very concerned with 
topics like environmental preservation. Providing them with food for thought raises awareness 
and concern for environmental problems and fosters values, goals and behavioral intentions to 
do an effort to solve them. Quickly, however, the awareness trickles through that acting on 
these intentions will involve certain personal costs. After all, doing the right thing is often less 
convenient, more effortful, or more expensive than the traditional alternatives. It seems easier 
to ease our conscience by rejecting the message rather than by changing our lifestyle. 
Possibly, the current upsurge in environmental awareness might just prove to be a temporary 
fad.  
 
I hope the present dissertation will contribute to a better fate for people’s commitment 
to pro-environmental action. It deals with the question how to persuade individuals to pursue 
the interest of others (i.e., other people, the environment, society at large, or even their 
future selves), in spite of consistent temptation by immediate self-interested motives. In a 
first manuscript we analyze the decision making process in situations characterized by a 
conflict between personal en collective interest. In manuscripts II and III we present 
persuasion tools which can complement traditional, information-based social marketing 
strategies aimed at promoting pro-environmental conduct. The resulting insights can easily be 
adapted for application in other fields of sustainable development, like purchasing fair trade 
products, or for the promotion of other socially desirable behaviors, like healthy behavior, 





Environmental Decision Making as a Social Dilemma 
 
A social dilemma is an interdependence situation in which each participant experiences 
a conflict between pursuing his or her personal interest, and pursuing the collective interest 
(Hardin, 1968). When a salesman tries to persuade someone into buying a certain car, he 
wants to show how getting that car is in the client’s best interest: it is a safe, reliable car for a 
good price. When a politician tries to win your vote, he will attempt to convince you that 
voting for him or her is in your best interest, because s/he is more able at defending you 
rights than the opposition. This is a powerful persuasion technique, as people are always 
motivated to serve their self-interest. It is trickier business, however, to try persuading the 
client, who just bought his new car, to respect speed limits and traffic regulations. In such a 
situation the individual experiences a conflict between pursuing his or her self-interest and the 
interest of others. The self-interested choice consists of enjoying testing the limits of the car, 
to arrive at the destination quicker, or simply the freedom to do what one wants. Slower and 
more careful driving would be in the interest of the other road users, because it decreases 
their risk of being involved in an accident. In a social dilemma the outcome for a certain 
individual depends on his or her behavior and on the behavior of others involved. Every 
individual must decide between a selfish (drive fast) and socially desirable (drive slow and 
safe) option. For every individual, it is tempting to make a selfish choice. But, if everybody 
involved makes that selfish choice, the final outcome will be less desirable for everyone (i.e., 
more frequent and more serious accidents) than in the case in which everybody makes the 
socially desirable choice. It is a challenge for social marketers to convince people to take the 
benefit of others into account when making choices in social dilemmas.  
 
Several researchers have identified the decision whether or not to behave pro-
environmentally as a social dilemma (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Mark Van Vugt et al., 1996a; 
Wiener & Doescher, 1991). Choosing to conserve the environment is considered to be a 
cooperative behavior because it serves the interest of society in the long term. On the other 
hand, behavioral costs associated with this type of actions, like money, time, effort, and 
inconvenience tempt individuals to make selfish choices (Follows & Jobber, 2000a; Pieters, 
1989; Pieters et al., 1998; Thøgersen, 1994a). Take the example of car use. Traveling by car 
instead of by public transportation or the bike is in the individual’s personal interest. It is 
usually faster, more flexible, more comfortable and it protects against rain and wind. If all 
people would do so, however, the collective interest will be hurt, because roads become 
congested and CO2 emissions will increase, which adds to global warming effects. The task of 
environmental policy makers and social marketers is to encourage individuals to pursue the 
interest of others, the collective, or society at large, despite the persistent temptation to do 
the opposite by self-interested motives.  
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The traditional social marketing approach 
 
Social marketing is a field which specializes in promoting socially desirable behavior by 
using insights and concepts from marketing. Traditionally, the social marketing approach relies 
on the assumption that in order to change people’s behavior, it is necessary to make them 
think about the consequences of  behavioral alternatives (Andreasen, 1995). Wiener and 
Doescher (1991), for example, propose that consumers need to be convinced of the fact that 
the collective goal is worth pursuing and that it is likely to materialize. Further, they claim that 
social marketers should emphasize the importance of each individual’s contribution. The 
associated preference for using educational campaigns, which communicate information and 
arguments in favor of socially desirable behavior, has led to successful efforts at generating 
awareness about certain issues and at fostering positive values, attitudes, and behavioral 
intentions. In spite of these positive shifts, such campaigns have been disappointingly 
unsuccessful at making people change their behavior (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). This way a 
value-behavior gap has developed (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Mainieri et al., 1997; Oskamp 
et al., 1991). For social marketing to be successful at changing people’s behavior, the 
development of a complementary persuasion approach seems to be required. In what follows, 
we will first describe a series of reasons why information-based campaigns might fail to 
change behavior. Afterwards we will propose a complementary persuasion strategy that may 
steer clear of the pitfalls associated with the traditional social marketing approach. 
 
Backlash effects associated with information-based campaign strategies 
 
Research in social psychology and marketing has identified several reasons why 
encouraging people to think, through campaigns based on education and argumentation, may 
result in backlash effects. We will list and describe five of them here. First, targets may show 
psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Reich & Robertson, 1979); people are 
motivated to counter a perceived threat to their freedom of personal choice by doing the 
opposite of what the persuasion message suggests. Second, messages using a fear appeal aim 
at motivating people to think about possible disastrous consequences of non-ecological 
behavior. Provoking fear, however, might lead to a process called fear control. Extreme fear is 
an aversive state, which individuals may try to evade by minimizing the perceived risks 
through source derogation (“these studies can’t be right”, see the second wave reaction to “An 
Inconvenient Truth”), defensive denial (“It won’t happen to me”), or wishful thinking 
(“Probable scientists will come up with a way to solve it”). Successful fear reduction strategies 
will lead to a decreased likelihood of engaging in corrective action to avoid the undesirable 
consequences (Witte & Allen, 2000). Third, social marketing messages discouraging non-
desirable behavior may hold a “descriptive norm meta-message” (Cialdini, 2003). Saying that 
“a problematic behavior needs urgent attention because it is very prevalent” implies that it is a  
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common behavior. Research on descriptive norms (Cialdini et al., 1990) suggests that simply 
doing what everyone else is doing is often preferred over doing what the minority does, even 
if that would be a morally superior course of action. Therefore such a message, ironically, 
might be interpreted as a justification to keep on engaging in the undesirable behavior. 
Fourth, these messages may elicit a state of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), as people 
experience a contradiction between what they think they should be doing and their actual 
behavior. Individuals may reduce dissonance by acting upon the (pro-environmental) value. 
However, cognitive dissonance may be resolved via other routes that do not result in the 
desired behavioral change. It is less effortful to reduce cognitive dissonance when one does 
not change his or her behavior, but rather assimilates his or her behavioral and moral values 
regarding environmentalism to the present (less pro-environmental) behavior (Albarracín & 
McNatt, 2005). Alternatively, avoiding dissonance may even be achieved by simply ignoring 
the request. Fifth, making people think about why they should act ecological, makes them 
think about why they should not as well (Albarracin & Wyer, 2001; Warlop et al., 2003, p. 
205). For example, making people think about the environmental benefits of taking one’s bike 
leads to contemplating the private costs of this behavior (e.g., getting wet in the rain) and the 
private benefits of alternatives (e.g., the comfort of one’s car) as well. As private costs and 
benefits are more salient than public costs and benefits (Rothschild, 1979), such a deliberation 
process is likely to result in the individual choosing the selfish option (i.e., the non-
environmentally friendly behavior).  
 
These examples show that encouraging people to think about the benefits of social 
desirable (e.g., environmentally friendly) behavior, might result in the ironic effect of making 
them decide to pursue their self-interest. It is possible that the contribution of traditional 
social marketing actions is limited to cultivating such preservation values and attitudes. 
Another approach, then, is necessary to translate these values into preservation behavior. 
 
A Complementary Approach: influence automatic decision making 
 
People are not always the rational and reasoned decision makers they are assumed to 
be according to the social marketing tradition. To the contrary, many choices in daily life are 
executed as part of a continuous stream of behaviors which are executed fairly automatically, 
based on heuristics and minimal informational input (Alba et al., 1991; Warlop et al., 2003). 
Low-involvement choices with an environmental impact are no exception. The social 
intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) states that judgments are generally the result of quick, 
automatic evaluations or intuitions. In a decision situation, it will be the value that is 
temporarily most salient and perceived to be relevant that determines the behavioral choice.  
Construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2000) predicts that 
positive beliefs about a goal or value are more readily accessible in long-term decisions,  
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whereas negative beliefs related to that goal (e.g., the difficulty to obtain it) predominate in 
short-term decisions. When challenged to contemplate the environmental impact of behavior 
alternatives by social marketing messages, one thinks on an abstract level about future 
behavior. In this case, positive beliefs related to conservation behavior are likely to be salient. 
This may lead to making personal resolutions to act upon this value in the future. In the here 
and now of making a decision, however, the benefits of the concrete, lower-order goal of 
serving the self-interest is likely to be more salient than the higher-order preservation goal. 
From this analysis follows that a successful complementary persuasion approach should (1) 
make the relevant (pro-environmental) values more accessible and (2) avoid active 
contemplation at the moment of decision making. 
 
It is important to remark here that we do not imply that education and providing 
arguments are a waste of time and money. First, the social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) 
emphasizes the importance of social and cultural influences on the shaping of automatic 
behavior. People’s decisions are often the result of automatic evaluations rather than of a 
reasoning process, but these automatic evaluations can be manipulated. We will show this in 
Manuscript I. Repeated exposure to arguments in favor of preservation efforts, might result in 
such beliefs to become internalized and automatically activated. 
 
Second, as we argued, the traditional marketing approach has been successful at 
fostering favorable attitudes and values regarding preservation efforts. It should continue to 
do so, as this is a first step towards realizing a sustainable change in people’s behavior. It 
seems necessary, however, to complement an argument-based approach with other tools 
which can activate these existing values at the moment of environmental decision making. In 
manuscript II and III we will present two such tools, named Positive Cueing and Social 
Labeling. 
 
Overview of the Manuscripts 
 
 
In this doctoral dissertation we present three manuscripts. A first one has a more 
theoretical focus and deals with the decision making process in social dilemmas. Manuscript II 
and III are of an applied nature and each presents a persuasion tool which can be used to 
translate existing pro-environmental values in consistent behavior. Each manuscript is written 
so that it can be read independently of the others. Therefore there might be some overlap 







In this manuscript, we analyze the decision making process in social dilemmas. In this 
context, Social value orientation (SVO) is a heavily studied concept (e.g., Van Lange et al., 
1998; e.g., Mark Van Vugt et al., 1995). It categorizes people according to preferred patterns 
of outcomes between the self and others in interdependence situations. Commonly used 
categorizations distinguish people who are cooperators, individualists, or competitors. 
Cooperators (or pro-socials) prefer to maximize group outcomes and equality in outcomes. 
Individualists and competitors (or pro-selfs) prefer to maximize personal outcomes. Van 
Lange, De Bruin, Otten, and Joireman (1997b) argued that these tendencies develop during 
our lifetime through experiences with interdependence situations. The analogy with moral 
intuitions, which, according to Haidt (2001), are automatically activated moral judgments that 
develop through social and cultural interactions, made us expect that these social value 
orientations may be automatically activated preferences.  
 
This idea contrasts with the commonly held believe that pursuing the self-interest is an 
automatically activated goal (van den Bos et al., 2006), and that engaging in pro-social 
behavior requires some kind of cognitive operation. We hypothesized that this would be true 
for pro-selfs, but not for pro-socials. On the other hand, we expected that if decisions would 
be based on a more elaborated thinking process, pursuing the self-interest would be a salient 
motive for all people. We attribute this to the fact that behaving selfishly has become a social 
norm in our society (D. T. Miller, 1999) and that private costs and benefits are more salient 
than public costs and benefits (Rothschild, 1979; Warlop et al., 2003) when thinking about 
outcome distributions.  
 
A series of four studies, in which Dictator Games were played as a simulation for 
decision making in real life social dilemmas, supported these hypotheses. In a Dictator Game 
two participants are paired. One of them receives an amount of money and is instructed to 
divide the money between himself and his partner. The size of a dictator’s “donation” is a 
measure for cooperation level. We showed that decisions to donate are the result of a two-
step process. In an initial, automatic and intuitive, step, participants anchored their donations 
according to their social value orientations. Pro-socials intuitively tend to cooperate to a larger 
degree than pro-selfs. In a second step, in which individuals reason more elaborately about 
the decision at hand, both pro-socials and pro-selfs tend to benefit their immediate self-
interest. 
 
Additionally we showed that the automatic effect of social value orientations is due to a 
differential perception of the closeness of one’s relationship with the interaction partner. Pro-
socials chronically feel closer to anonymous other people than pro-selfs. This is, at least partly,  
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the reason for their intuitive tendency to cooperate. Interestingly, we also showed it is 
possible to influence such perceptions and the resulting automatic decisions. By making people 
feel closer to their interaction partner, donation sizes increase if the decision is made 
automatically, but not when it is contemplated more elaborately. 
 
We argued before that most of our daily behavior is executed rather automatically. In 
this light, the present results may offer new perspectives on the way social marketing 
strategies may reach their objectives. They suggest that techniques, which activate people’s 
pro-environmental values, while preventing them from contemplating extensively on a current 
decision, should be efficient in changing people’s automatic evaluations in a pro-environmental 




In this manuscript we studied the potential of “social labeling” for the promotion of 
pro-environmental behavior. Social labeling is a persuasion technique that consists of 
providing a person with a statement about his or her personality or values (i.e., the social 
label) in an attempt to provoke behavior that is consistent with the label. Like a bottle of wine 
carries a label, describing its content, we can “label” other people, describing some aspect of 
their personality. For example, Miller, Brickman, and Bolen (1975) showed that telling a group 
of fifth-graders that they are very tidy was more efficient in making them keep their classroom 
free of litter than an explicit plea for tidiness. The technique is believed to rely on a self-
perception process and the fact that people’s (interpretation of) past behavior guides future 
action (Albarracín & McNatt, 2005; Burger & Caldwell, 2003; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Tybout 
& Yalch, 1980).  
 
We propose and test an adapted version that allows this technique to be applicable as 
a social marketing tool in mass-media campaigns. In a first step of this two-step procedure, 
the individual is provoked to perform a certain pro-environmental act. This could be, for 
example, the purchase of an environmentally friendly variety of a product, like bio-products or 
propellant-free deodorant. In some cases this will require some type of external motivation, 
like a price promotion. In other cases, the consumer might simply prefer the environmentally 
friendly product, because of other product features than its environmental friendliness. In a 
second step, a social label is communicated which attributes the purchase to the consumers’ 
environmental values. For example, one could print a message on the packaging (e.g., 
“[brand X] – For those who care about their environment”), which invites the consumer to 
(mis)-attribute the ecological purchase to their value of caring for the environment. We 
hypothesized that if this reattribution process is successful, the individual is likely to perceive  
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himself as more concerned with the environment and act upon this new self-perception 
subsequently. 
 
In four studies we applied such a procedure which suggests an internal attribution of 
an externally motivated pro-environmental choice. Participants were asked to indicate which 
TV-set they preferred from a list of seven TVs. These were evaluated on seven dimensions, 
including “Image quality”, “sound quality”, and “environmental aspects”. One TV-set, which 
was most popular (chosen by 95-100% of participants) scored best on image and sound 
quality, but it also happened to have a maximum score on environmental aspects. 
Subsequently, we provided a social label describing the typical consumer who preferred this 
particular TV-set as “very concerned with the environment, and ecologically conscious”.  
 
Results indicated that this procedure is most successful at eliciting pro-environmental 
choices, if participants were distracted, either at the moment of processing the label or at the 
moment of making decisions. This suggests the labeling effect is an automatic one and that it 
works best in common, cognitively demanding circumstances. Additionally, results indicated 
that the label is not merely used as a guide in subsequent decisions; it also results in a re-




In this manuscript we propose and test another persuasion tool, which we named 
“positive cueing”. Analogous to social labeling, it attempts to promote pro-environmental 
decision making by increasing individual’s self-perceptions as being a person who is concerned 
with environmental issues. People tend to use (perceptions of) previous behavior as a heuristic 
for current decision making. Previous research suggests, however, that individuals 
underestimate the level of their previous pro-environmental conduct (Raghubir & Menon, 
2005). The main reason is that many commonly displayed environmental behaviors are 
somewhat ambiguous with respect to their ecological nature. Common behaviors, like 
switching off light in unused rooms, for example, tend to be attributed to a concern to reduce 
one’s electricity bill or to mere habit. Therefore these behaviors are not considered diagnostic 
to infer one’s environmental concern from. 
 
With four studies, we showed that cueing such commonly performed environmental 
behaviors as environmental results in increased pro-environmental decision making. We also 
revealed the process responsible for this effect. Positive cueing  increases the perceived 
diagnosticity of common environmental behaviors to derive environmental attitudes from. 
Subsequent, the manipulation renders people’s attitudes towards ecological behaviors more 
favorable and makes them perceive themselves more as concerned with the environment.  
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Using the self-perception that one is “the kind of person that usually makes pro-environmental 
decisions” as a decision heuristic, accounted for the success of the positive cueing 
manipulation.  





   
 
Me First and the Gimme Gimmes:  







We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that 
decisions are the result of a two-step process (Study 2). In a first step, decision makers 
generate an automatic, intuitive proposal, which they adjust in a second, more deliberated 
phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one’s Social Value Orientation 
determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the 
dictator’s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver (Study 1 and 3). Self-interested 
concerns subsequently lead to a reduction of donation size in step 2. Study 4 shows that 
increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making. 
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The conception of man as solely driven by self-interest, the homo economicus (Etzioni, 
1990; Luce & Raiffa, 1957; Schwartz, 1986; Wallach & Wallach, 1983) has been challenged 
repeatedly over the last 30 years (Camerer, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 
2000; Haidt, 2001; Henrich et al., 1991; Kolm, 2000; Roth et al., 1981). Most researchers 
now accept the existence of prosocial motives, such as serving the interests of others or the 
collective, or achieving equality in resource distributions (Frey & Meier, 2004; Mansbridge, 
1990; Sober & Wilson, 1998). These motives have been attributed to factors like reciprocity 
(Van Lange, 1999), empathy (Batson et al., 1988), a justice motive (Lerner, 1977), norms of 
fairness (Kahneman et al., 1986), a concern for social welfare (Charness & Rabin, 2001), 
moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001), or the experience of a ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1990). Inter-
individual differences in tendencies towards cooperation and defection are captured by the 
“social value orientation” (SVO) concept (McClintock, 1972; Messick & McClintock, 1968). SVO 
has been shown to predict several types of pro-social behavior (McClintock & Allison, 1989; 
Nauta et al., 2002; van Vugt et al., 1996).  
 
In this paper we aim at getting more insight in the nature of the decision process 
underlying giving in the dictator game (DG). We chose the DG because it lacks clear norms 
specifying “fair behavior”, a feature which we suggest to be characteristic of natural social 
dilemmas. We argue that SVOs represent automatic, intuitive judgments of appropriate 
behavior (i.e., moral intuitions) in situations characterized by a conflict between personal and 
collective interests. We also examined the nature of these intuitive judgments. We argue and 
show, by means of both mediation and experimental analyses, that the spontaneous effect of 
SVOs operates via perceptions of interpersonal closeness. Further, we argue that decisions in 
such situations are the result of a two-step process. An automatic process elicits more or less 
cooperative behavior in a first step, determined by one’s moral intuitions. These intuitions are 
captured by the SVO concept. In the second step, a controlled cognitive process corrects this 
initial inclination, usually in a self-serving direction.  
 
Social Value Orientations 
 
Messick and McClintock (1968; McClintock, 1972) proposed the social value orientation 
(SVO) concept to describe individual differences in the extent to which people take others’ 
outcomes into account when making decisions in interdependence dilemma’s. A SVO describes 
a relatively stable preference for a certain pattern of outcome distributions between the self 
and others. Usually three types are distinguished (McClintock, 1972; Messick & McClintock, 
1968; Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1989, 1991): cooperators, individualists, and 
competitors. Cooperators (or pro-socials) prefer to maximize joint outcomes and maximize 
equality in outcomes. Individualists aim at maximizing personal outcomes with little or no 
regard for others’ outcomes. Competitors prefer to maximize the difference between their and  
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others’ outcomes. Individualists and competitors are often treated as one group with a pro-self 
orientation, because they prefer to maximize their outcomes either absolutely (individualists) 
or relatively (competitors).  
 
SVOs have shown to predict behavior in interdependence dilemmas (e.g., Kramer et 
al., 1986; Van Vugt et al., 1995). These are characterized by a choice conflict between 
pursuing the collective and the personal interest. Individual outcomes are determined by both 
the choice the individual makes and those of the others involved. Individual rationality tempts 
people to make non-cooperative, defective choices, because these result in higher personal 
outcomes, regardless of what others do. If everyone involved follows this individual rationality, 
however, individual outcomes will be lower than in the case that everyone behaves according 
to collective rationality, which prescribes making cooperative choices (Dawes, 1980). Many 
daily life situations are analogous to this pay-off structure. SVO has shown to predict choices 
between traveling by public transport and taking one’s own car (Van Lange et al., 1998; van 
Vugt et al., 1996), willingness to pursue the goals of an organization one belongs to at a 
personal cost (Nauta et al., 2002), willingness to sacrifice in close relationships (Van Lange et 
al., 1997a), helping behavior (McClintock & Allison, 1989), and intentions to behave pro-
environmentally (Gärling et al., 2003; Joireman et al., 2001). In some situations, however, 
behavior of pro-socials and pro-selfs coincides. We will propose a two-step decision process in 
interdependence dilemmas that may provide an explanation for this inconsistency.  
 
Fairness and decision making in social dilemmas 
 
Decision makers in social interdependence situations often rely on cognitively efficient 
processing and follow simple rules or heuristics to guide their responses (Burger et al., 2004; 
Cialdini, 2001; De Dreu & Boles, 1998; Messick, 1993; Roch et al., 2000). Most researchers 
agree that fairness is an important concern in such situations (e.g., Turillo et al., 2002). Some 
situations, like resource dilemmas or public good games, offer objective indications about the 
fair contribution of each group member (Harris & Joyce, 1980; Ledyard, 1995; Messick, 1993; 
Rutte et al., 1987). The instructions of the resource dilemma, for example, frame the 
endowment as a common pool. This provokes participants to calculate their fair share by 
dividing the size of the pool by the number of participants in the game. 
 
Many N-person real life social dilemmas do not provide such objective guides to 
decision making, however: How much of the waste I produce should I select so it can be 
recycled? How often should I take the bus instead of my own car to contribute fairly to a 
reduction in carbon-dioxide emission? How much money should I donate to charity 
organizations to be a good citizen? In such situations, other heuristics must play a role. We 
argue that a Dictator Game (DG) is a better model of real-life social dilemmas than a resource  
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game. In a DG an amount of money is provided to one of two players, named the dictator. He 
or she decides on the allocation of this endowment between the dictator and the recipient, 
who does not have any power over that decision at all. In this situation, objective guidelines of 
how much one should donate to the recipient are absent, like in many real life contexts. 
Dictators have to rely on another decision principle. Ruffle (1998) showed that dictators are 
concerned with enhancing their self-concept and hence have to resolve the trade-off between 
maintaining a positive self-perception as a fair person on the one hand and the pursuit of 
personal gains on the other hand. Like in resource dilemmas, most researchers agree that 
dictator giving is largely affected by concerns for a fair distribution of the endowment (Bolton 
et al., 1998; Ruffle, 1998; Schotter et al., 1996). Dictators appear to decide on an appropriate 
donation according to how much they think the recipient deserves to receive (Eckel & 
Grossman, 1996; Hoffman et al., 2000; Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985). “Deservingness” might be 
inferred from a recipient’s personal wealth, or the effort s/he did in a task related to the DG, 
for example. However, in many real life situations, even this information is lacking or not 
applicable. We argue that there is a deeper level process that guides people’s decisions in 
social dilemmas that lack clear norms of conduct, and that do not provide information on the 
characteristics of the other player. This process is based on the perceived interpersonal 
closeness with an interaction partner. In the next paragraph, we argue why this process is 
important in explaining decisions in social dilemmas, and explain how the perception of 
interpersonal closeness may explain individual differences in social value orientation.  
 
Social value orientations and interpersonal closeness 
 
Biologists have suggested that cooperative tendencies have developed because 
promoting reproductive success of genetically related individuals benefits the proliferation of 
shared genes (Hamilton, 1964). The degree of shared genes can not be detected directly, so 
w e  h a v e  t o  r e l y  o n  c u e s  t h a t  a r e  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  g e n e t i c  c o m m o n a l i t y  ( K r e b s ,  1 9 9 1 ) ,  l i k e  
kinship, friendship, similarity, and familiarity (Cunningham, 1986; Rushton et al., 1984). This 
suggests that we tend to be more cooperative with people we consider to be close to us. Work 
on social discounting supports this idea (Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Rachlin & Raineri, 1992): 
People are less willing to forgo a fixed amount of money to benefit the other, with increasing 
social distance between themselves and the other. Other research has shown that cues 
affecting perceived interpersonal closeness lead to automatic and spontaneous expressions of 
interconnectedness (Holland et al., 2004). It is therefore reasonable to assume that individual 
differences in SVO are related to stable individual differences in the perception of social 
distance with other people in general. 
 
 We hypothesize that SVOs are related to differences in interpersonal closeness (Aron 
et al., 1992; Aron et al., 1991; Aron & Fraley, 1999; Cialdini et al., 1997; De Cremer &  
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Stouten, 2003) with random and anonymous other people, and that this perception mediates 
the effect of SVO on cooperative behavior. According to Aron et al. (1991), close relationships 
are characterized by the feeling that some of the partner’s aspects are partially the person’s 
own. Aron et al. (1991) found that people’s decisions in a resource allocation task were more 
fair when their relationship with the interaction partner was closer. When they imagined their 
partner to be a close friend, they gave more than in the case that the partner was assumed to 
be friendly acquaintance, and they gave even less when they imagined the partner to be a 
stranger. We hypothesize that pro-socials chronically perceive “other people” in general as 
closer to themselves, which elicits cooperative behavior in interdependence dilemmas that do 
not provide further cues to steer their decisions. Giving to the other, in this perspective, 
equals giving to oneself, to a certain degree (Cialdini et al., 1997), and the group interest 
becomes interchangeable with the self-interest (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999).  
 
We consider this a relevant topic, as N-person real life dilemmas typically involve 
many anonymous interaction partners. If differences in cooperative behavior are due to how 
the anonymous interaction partners are perceived, then manipulating these perceptions may 
be used as a tool to promote cooperative behavior in interdependence dilemmas. We will test 
this hypothesis and verify whether this feeling of interpersonal closeness mediates the effect 
of SVO on cooperative behavior. We will do so by means of both mediation analyses and 
experimental design.  
 
We further argue that the process we outlined (SVO – interpersonal closeness – 
decisions in social dilemmas) is spontaneous. We first propose a two-step model of decision 
making in an anonymous DG, describing how dictators deal with the trade-off between self-
perception and personal gains. Then we outline how SVOs and interpersonal closeness operate 
within the framework of this two-step model.  
 
A two-step model of decision making in the anonymous Dictator Game 
 
Decision making in interdependence dilemmas usually consists of a two-step process 
(Roch et al., 2000). In line with dual process models of cognition, an initial heuristic-based 
automatic anchoring step is followed by a deliberation phase in which these initial action 
tendencies are adjusted according a systematic analysis of the interaction situation (Chaiken 
et al., 1989; Chen & Chaiken, 1999). The decision maker only engages in this second phase if 
he is sufficiently motivated and has sufficient cognitive resources at his disposal to do so. 
 
The social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001) states that moral decisions, like the one 
between cooperation and defection, are generally the result of quick, automatic evaluations or 
intuitions. These intuitions are shaped by social and cultural influences that become  
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internalized during the course of personality development. Van Lange et al. (1997b) provided 
evidence for SVO being such a socially shaped orientation, developed through experiences 
with situations of interdependence. This suggests that SVOs represent inter-individual 
differences in moral intuitions. These would result in quick, automatic reactions in 
interdependence situations, triggering either a tendency to cooperate (pro-socials) or to defect 
(pro-selfs) in a first step.  
 
In a second step, decision makers engage in a more effortful cognitive analysis of the 
interaction situation, which leads to an adjustment of these initial inclinations. Immediate self-
interested motives are very salient in such an analysis (Roch et al., 2000). This implies that 
dictators are very sensitive to arguments which allow them to deviate from the distribution 
proposed by their intuitive system and pursue these self-serving tendencies. They may find 
several reasons to do so. First, Miller (1999) showed that in Western cultures, a norm prevails 
that says that self-interest ought to be a powerful determinant of behavior. Dictators might 
argue they should comply with this norm, which avoids them to become the “sucker” (Orbell & 
Dawes, 1991). Second, the “I’m no saint”-hypothesis of Bolton, Katok and Zwick (1998) 
implies that within constraints of personal and social rules dictators do behave in a self-
interested manner. They might consider it their right to keep a large share or the full 
endowment because the rules by which they were assigned as the dictator were fair. Dictators 
might reason that recipients simply had tough luck that roles were assigned as they were, but 
it is not the dictator’s responsibility to correct for this situation. Kagel, Kim, and Moser (1996) 
illustrated this tendency to twist fairness interpretations in a self-serving direction in games 
with asymmetric information and asymmetric pay-offs. Proposers in a standard ultimatum 
game
1, where 100 chips were to be divided, offered the usual shares, approaching 50%. When 
the proposer, but not the responder, knew that chips were worth 30 cents to the proposer but 
only 10 cents to the responder, the proposer could take 75% of the total outcome and still 
appear fair, by giving 50% of the chips. That is indeed what the researchers observed. This 
illustrates that proposers will tend to behave self-interested, if they can justify it to 
themselves (Babcock et al., 1995; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). We predict that such a 
self-serving adjustment phase will influence donation of pro-socials to a larger extent than 
pro-selfs, because pro-socials’ intuitive system anchored on a higher donation size. 
 
Automatic and systematic reasoning differ in their demand for cognitive resources 
(e.g., Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Since automatic processes do not require as many cognitive 
resources, they will be not disrupted by cognitive distractions (Ferreira et al., 2006). Therefore 
we can test the proposed two-step model by introducing a cognitive load manipulation during 
decision making. Because step 1 is the result of a fast, effortless, cognitively undemanding 
                                                 
1 An Ultimatum Game is similar to the DG, but in this game responders have the power to reject a 











process, it is unaffected by manipulations that interfere with reasoning capacity (Haidt, 2001; 
van den Bos et al., 2006), whereas a cognitive load manipulation should interfere with the 
reasoning process of step 2. Therefore, such a manipulation can prevent dictators from 
proceeding to engage in the process of finding justifications for non-cooperation after step 1. 
We hypothesize that SVOs determine allocation decisions when they are made under load 
conditions. We predict that pro-socials will donate more than pro-selfs in this situation. If 
sufficient cognitive resources are available to allow further deliberation, in a situation without 
cognitive load, dictators will adjust their donations in a self-serving direction after finding 
justifications for doing so. Therefore we expect donations to be lower in a situations without 
load, especially for pro-socials, compared to the donations of those whose cognitive resources 
are constrained. 
 
Overview of the studies 
 
We test our two-step model, see Figure 1, in four studies. In a first study we verify the 
relation between SVO and interpersonal closeness (arrow 1 in Figure 1). In Study 2 we test 
our model’s prediction that SVO-effects will be larger when dictators show low levels of 
deliberation, compared to high levels of deliberation (arrow 3 in Figure 1). Since the 
deliberation phase that results in self-interested decisions is effortful, we can suppress it with 
a cognitive load manipulation. We predict that dictators, when under cognitive load, will not 
proceed further than step 1, and will base their allocations only on their SVO. After additional 
deliberation, however, dictators, especially pro-social ones, will decrease the size of their 
donations. In Study 3 we examine whether interpersonal closeness mediates the effect of SVO 
and interacts with deliberation level to influence the size of the donation (arrows 1, 2, and 3 in 
F i gu r e  1 ) .  In  a  l a s t s tu d y  w e  v e ri f y  w he th e r we can manipulate interpersonal closeness to 














Figure 1. The two-step model of dictator decision making: SVO effects are mediated by interpersonal 







According to our model, interpersonal closeness mediates the automatic effect of SVO 
on pro-social behavior. In a first step, we want to verify whether pro-socials and pro-selfs 
indeed have a chronic different perception of the closeness of their relationship with an 
anonymous interaction partner. To that end, we measured participants’ SVOs and asked them 





Participants and procedure  
 
The participants were 108 undergraduate students (59 male, 49 female), for partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. They came to the lab in groups of five to eight and were 
seated individually in front of a computer screen in semi-closed cubicles. First they completed 
the Ring Measure of Social Values and the closeness measure. The order of both measures 
was counterbalanced. This took about 10-15 minutes, after which they continued with other 




Ring Measure of Social Values 
 We measured SVO using the Ring Measure of Social Values (Liebrand, 1984). This 
measure contains 24 items, each representing two imaginary money distributions between the 
self and another person. Participants are asked to indicate which distribution they prefer. They 
are instructed to imagine they play with an anonymous person who receives the same items 
and individual outcomes are determined by the choices that both players make. Amounts of 
money can be positive or negative. Distributions are selected from a circle in the own/other 
outcome plane defined by two orthogonal dimensions. One represents the outcomes for the 
self and the other represents outcomes for the other. The center of the circle is the origin of 
the outcome plane (of which the coordinates are 0 € for the self and 0 € for the other), and its 
radius is 150 €
2. On the circle 24 equidistant points are selected. Each point represents a 
distribution between the self and the other. Each item in the measure contains two such points 
which are located adjacent on the circle. An example of an item is a choice between 
alternative A: 130 € for the self and 75 € for the other, and alternative B: 145 € for the self 
and 39 € for the other. After making the 24 choices, we calculated the total amount of money 
allocated to the self and the other. These two totals can be represented as coordinates on the 
                                                 
2 150 € equals about 180 US $  
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horizontal (own outcomes) and vertical (other’s outcomes) axis, defining a single point in the 
plane. This point provides an estimate of the direction of the participant’s vector in the 
outcome plane. The vector represents the participant’s social value orientation. Each vector 
reflects a unique pattern of choices. Participants are classified on the Ring Measure as making 
choices consistent with one of the social value orientations. Participants with vectors falling 
between 22.5° and 112.5° are classified as pro-socials and participants with orientation 
vectors falling between 292.5° (or –67.5°) and 22.5° are classified as pro-selfs. Of the 112 
participants, 31 (28.7 %) could be identified as pro-socials and 73 (67.6 %) could be 
identified as pro-selfs. Such a skewed distribution is not uncommon (Liebrand & McClintock, 
1988; Sheldon et al., 2003). Four participants (3.7 %) could not be identified because they 
had an orientation vector of exactly 22.5° or because the vector was out of range (more than 
112.5°). The data on the Ring Measure allow calculating the length of each vector, which is an 
index for the consistency with which the SVO is manifested (Hertel & Fiedler, 1998). A 
maximal consistency score implies that the participant’s preferred orientation on the Ring 
Measure remains consistent across all trials (Liebrand, 1984). The consistency score is 
expressed as a percentage representing the ratio of the length of a vector, compared to the 
maximal length a vector can have. Usually, only the data of those participants with a 
consistency index higher than 60% are retained for analysis (Liebrand, 1984; Smeesters et 
al., 2003). Four participants (3.7 %) had a consistency score lower than 60 % and were 
discarded from further analysis. A total of 100 participants (71 pro-selfs and 29 pro-socials) 
remained for further analysis. 
 
Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale 
We measured interpersonal closeness with the “Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale” 
(IOS scale; Aron et al., 1992). This is a single-item, pictorial measure of closeness, see figure 
2. In the IOS Scale, respondents select the picture that best describes their relationship with 
an interaction partner from a set of Venn-like diagrams each representing different degrees of 
overlap of two circles. One circle represents the self (S) and the other represents the other 
person (O). The figures were designed so that the degree of overlap progresses linearly, 
creating a seven-step, interval-level scale. The anchors are, at one end, two circles that touch 






Figure 2.  The Self–Other Merging scale contains seven pairs of circles. One circle represents yourself (S), 
and the other circle represents the other (O). Indicate which pair of circles reflects the relation 
between you and person you just played the game with / will play the game with best. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
 We conducted an ANOVA to verify whether pro-socials and pro-selfs have a different 
perception of the closeness of their relationship with the anonymous interaction partner in the 
Ring Measure. Results indicated this is the case, F(1, 98) = 18.32, p < .01. Pro-socials 
indicated to feel closer (M = 4.52, SD = 1.30) than pro-selfs (M = 2.99, SD = 1.74). An 
alternative, continuous measure for SVO consists of using the vector angle. Higher numbers 
indicate a larger tendency to be pro-social. Therefore we can calculate a correlation between 
this vector angle and closeness. That correlation was significant, r(100) = .48, p < .01, 
indicating again that a higher tendency to behave pro-socially is associated with perceiving the 
relationship with an anonymous interaction partner as closer. 
In this study we verified the first part of our model (arrow 1 in Figure 1), and found 
that SVOs indeed represent chronic differences in the perceived closeness with an anonymous 




In study 2 we tested whether level of deliberation (manipulated with a cognitive load 
task) moderates the effect of SVO on DG giving. Our model predicts that when level of 
deliberation is low, people base their donation decisions in DGs on their SVOs. If level of 
deliberation is high, however, dictators will analyze the situation more elaborately and look for 
reasons why they can reduce donations and still consider themselves fair and just people. The 
intuitive system of pro-socials anchors on higher donation sizes, compared pro-selfs,  in step 
1, so their decisions will be affected by the deliberation phase to a larger extend. Therefore we 







Participants and design 
 
 The participants were 160 undergraduate students (64 male, 96 female), for partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. The experimental design included two between-subjects 
factors. These were SVO (pro-social versus pro-self) and level of deliberation (cognitive load 
versus no cognitive load). The dependent measure was the number of 20 cent coins donated 
in a DG (ranging from 0 to 5). 
 
Procedure and Materials 
 
Participants came to the lab in groups of eight and were seated individually in front of 
a computer screen in semi-closed cubicles. After a short introduction to the procedure they 
were expected to follow in the next hour, they completed the DG. Then, after 25 minutes of 
unrelated filler tasks, they completed the Ring Measure of Social Values. 
 
The instructions for the DG appeared on the computer screen. Participants learned 
they were to keep any money they gained from these transactions. Then followed the 
deliberation level manipulation, for which we used a cognitive load task. Half of the 
participants were instructed to remember a random seven digit number (5684524); the others 
remembered an easier, structured sequence of seven digits (1234567). Then participants 
received five coins of € .20 and were asked to divide these between themselves and their 
interaction partner. Finally, they were asked to reproduce the number they had to remember. 




Seventy participants (43.8 %) could be identified as pro-socials and 85 (53.1 %) could 
be identified as pro-selfs. The SVO of five participants (3.1 %) could not be identified because 
they had an orientation vector of exactly 22.5°. Five additional participants (3.1%) were 
discarded from further analysis because their consistency score was lower than 60%. This 
way, 150 observations (70 pro-socials and 80 pro-selfs) remained for further analysis . 
 
An ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of SVO on the number of coins donated 
(F(1, 146) = 7.92, p < .01). Pro-socials (M = 2.15, SD = .96) donated more than pro-selfs (M 
= 1.68, SD = 1.08). We did not find a main effect of cognitive load, F < 1. The main effect of 
SVO was, however, qualified by a significant interaction effect of SVO and deliberation level 
(F(1, 146) = 7.10, p < .01). As expected, we found a significant effect of SVO under cognitive  
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load conditions, (F(1, 146) = 14.52, p < .01), with pro-socials (M = 2.45, SD = .95) donating 
more than pro-selfs (M = 1.53, SD = .97). Under no load conditions, we did not observe 
differences between pro-socials (M = 1.85, SD = .91) and pro-selfs (M = 1.83, SD = 1.20, 
F(1, 146) < 1). After deliberation, in the no load condition, pro-socials donated significantly 
less than in the condition with cognitive load (F(1, 146) = 5.91, p < .01). Donations by pro-





The results in this study confirmed that SVOs represent automatic, intuitive judgments 
in situations of interdependence. When we imposed a cognitive load, participants did not 
proceed further than step 1 and followed their moral intuition: Pro-socials donated more than 
pro-selfs. When level of deliberation was high, however, participants proceeded to a second 
phase in which they corrected their initial inclination and seemed to generate justifications for 
reducing the number of coins donated. This process mainly influences pro-socials, as they 
anchored on a high amount in step 1. When they deliberated their choice, the effect of their 
SVO was overruled and they donated as little as pro-selfs. These pro-selfs had anchored their 
decisions at a low number of coins in step 1. Apparently they do not deem it appropriate to 




Our full model states that SVO effects in step 1 are mediated by perceived 
interpersonal closeness with the anonymous interaction partner. In a second phase, in which 
one deliberates his or her choice more elaborately, one looks for reasons to reduce the 
donation (D. T. Miller, 1999). In the previous study we showed that in such a case, the effect 
of SVO is overruled. Therefore, we predict that if we run an identical design like the one in 
Study 2, a measure of interpersonal closeness should mediate the effects of SVO in low 




Participants and design 
 
The participants were 107 undergraduate students (36 male, 71 female), for partial 
fulfillment of a course requirement. The experimental design was identical to that of the 
previous study. We added an interpersonal closeness measure: the Inclusion of the Other in 
the Self Scale (Aron et al., 1992). 
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Procedure and Materials 
 
Participants came to the lab in groups of eight and were seated individually in front of 
a computer screen in semi-closed cubicles. After a short introduction to the procedure they 
were expected to follow in the next hour, they completed the DG. The only difference between 
this version and the one in Study 2 is that participants now received 11 coins of € .10 instead 
of 5 coins of € .20, to increase the potential  variance in the behavior. The manipulation of 
cognitive load was identical to the one in Study 2. 
 
After 25 minutes of unrelated filler tasks, respondents completed the Ring Measure of 
Social Values and the IOS scale. Half of the participants completed the Inclusion of the Other 
in the Self Scale before answering the 24 items of the Ring Measure, and the other half did so 
afterwards. We did not find any effect of the pos i t i o n  o f  t h i s  m e a s u r e ,  s o  i t  w i l l  n o t  b e  




Of 107 participants, 36 could be identified as pro-social (33.6 %) and 71 as pro-self 
(66.3 %). Five participants (4,7 %) were discarded from further analysis because their 
consistency score was lower than 60. This way, 102 observations (34 pro-social, 68 pro-self) 
remained for further analysis. 
Replicating Study 1, an ANOVA indicated that SVO was related to perceived 
interpersonal closeness, F(1, 100) = 16.70, p < .01. Pro-socials indicated to feel closer to an 
unknown interaction partner (M = 3.76, SD = 1.76) than pro-selfs (M = 2.50, SD = 1.31). 
Further, we replicated the interaction effect of Study 2 (F(1, 98) = 5.50, p < .02). Under load, 
pro-socials (M = 5.50, SD = .89) gave more coins than pro-selfs (M = 3.56, SD = 2.87, F(1, 
98) = 6.87, p < .01). After deliberation, in the no load condition, we did not find an effect of 
SVO (F<1). Donations of pro-socials decreased after deliberation (M = 3.78, SD = 2.21), 
compared to the load condition (F(1, 98) = 4.31, p < .04). Donations of pro-selfs did not differ 
between load conditions (Mno load = 4.22, Mload = 3.56, F(1, 98) = 1.27, p = .26). Neither the 
main effect of SVO (F(1, 98) = 2.16, p = .15) nor the one of cognitive load (F(1, 98) = 1.09, p 
= .30) was significant. 
 
To verify whether interpersonal closeness mediates the effect of SVO on donations in 
the load condition, but not in the no load condition, we used the bootstrapping procedure of 
Preacher, Rucker and Hayes (2005)
3. The OLS regression model indicated that SVO (with 0 for 
prosocials and 1 for proselfs) was related to interpersonal closeness (t(100) = -4.09, p < .01). 
                                                 
3 We used this procedure instead of the test of mediation proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) because it 
allows us to test the predicted mediated moderation directly.  
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The interaction effect of closeness and load on number of coins donated was significant (t(97) 
= -2.78, p < .01). Under load, the bootstrapped estimate of the indirect effect of SVO on 
number of coins donated, via interpersonal closeness, was significant with 99% confidence. 
The correlation between closeness and number of coins donated was significant, r(48) = .45, p 
< .01. In the no load condition, the indirect effect was not significant, p = .52. In this case, 




We provided evidence for our hypothesis that the automatic effect of SVO is at least 
partly due to a differential perception of the closeness of one’s relationship with an anonymous 
interaction partner. When we provoked intuitive reactions to the interdependence situation by 
imposing a cognitive load, participants anchored their decisions according to their SVO. The 
effect was mediated by the perceived closeness of their relation with the receiver. However, 
when they deliberated their answers more elaborately, pro-socials reduced the size of their 
donation, to a level equal to that of pro-selfs. In this condition perceived closeness was not 
related to the number of coins passed through. Apparently, when dictators have sufficient 
cognitive resources at their disposal to deliberate their decisions, the salience of immediate 
self-interested concerns motivates them to build a case for pursuing these self-serving 




In this study we want to provide further evidence for our model. Specifically, we will 
test our hypothesis that perceived closeness influences donation behavior, but only when the 
decision is made intuitively (i.e. under load). In the previous studies we measured SVO and 
showed that its influence on donation behavior is mediated by perceived closeness. However, 
it remains possible that perceived closeness is only a proxy of the process that links SVO to 
donation behavior (Spencer et al., 2005). To further corroborate the causal role of closeness, 
we manipulated it. We did so by identifying the receiver in a DG as a person who was either 
similar or dissimilar to the dictator with respect to the daily activities he or she engages in. We 
expect participants to feel closer to people who have a similar lifestyle. Further we predict that 
manipulated interpersonal closeness should influence donation amounts only when 
deliberation is constrained and choices are made in an automatic and intuitive way. If 
deliberation level is higher we expect donations of those who feel closer to the receiver to be 
as low as donations of those who feel more distant to the receiver. Therefore we predict an 
interaction effect between manipulated closeness and cognitive load, analogous to the 





Participants and design 
 
 The participants were 169 undergraduate students (43 male, 126 female). They were 
paid 6 € for participating one hour in a series of studies. The experimental design included two 
between-subjects factors: interpersonal closeness (distant versus close) and cognitive load 
(load versus no load). 
 
Procedure and Materials 
 
Participants came to the lab in groups of eight and were seated individually in front of 
a computer screen in semi-closed cubicles. After a short introduction, they started with a 15-
item questionnaire. Items probed how often participants engaged in certain leisure and other 
activities, like how often they watch the news, go to the movies, go shopping, buy CD’s, 
engage in sports, and how much they spend monthly using their cell phone. After 15 minutes 
of filler tasks they played a DG. Instructions were mostly identical to the ones used in Study 3, 
apart from the identification of the interaction partner. Instead of being explained that they 
would play with an anonymous other person participating with the same session, they learned 
that they would play with that participant whose answers on the 15-item questionnaire 
resembled their own answering profile most (Close condition) or least (Distant condition). 




We conducted a 2 (closeness) by 2 (cognitive load) ANOVA. We found a main effect of 
the closeness manipulation (Mclose = 4.56, Mdistant = 3.88, F(1, 165) = 6.46, p < .01), but not 
of cognitive load (F(1, 165) = 2.77, p = .09). This main effect was qualified by a significant 
interaction, showing exactly the same pattern as the one in Study 2 and 3 (F(1, 165) = 7.27, 
p < .01). In the cognitive load condition, we found a significant effect of our closeness 
manipulation (F(1, 165) = 12.06, p < .01), showing that those in the Close condition (M = 
5.15, SD = 1.48) gave more coins than those in the Distant condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.85). 
After deliberation, there was no effect of Closeness (Mclose = 3.98, Mdistant = 4.02, F < 1). 
Those in the Close condition gave significantly less (M = 3.98, SD = 1.84) after more 
deliberation (i.e. in the no load condition) than when under load (F(1, 165) = 9.00, p < .01). 
We found no effect of deliberation level on participants in the Distance condition, F < 1.  
 





We provided further evidence for the two step process of decision making in a DG. In a 
first step, dictators anchor on what they think is a fair amount to give, or their moral 
intuitions. Manipulating interpersonal closeness influenced the amount they consider to be fair. 
In a second, more deliberate step they try to make a case for the alternative intuition, the 
pursuit of immediate self-interest. This only influenced those who feel close to their interaction 
partner, as those who feel distant anchored on a low number to begin with, and seem not to 
deem it appropriate to donate even less. This implies that manipulating one’s perceived 





I n  t h i s  p a p e r  w e  p r o v i d e d  e v i d e n c e  f o r  f o u r  f a c t s .  F i r s t ,  w e  s h o w e d  t h a t  S V O s  
represent automatic, intuitive tendencies towards cooperation or defection in social dilemmas. 
Second, decision making in D(O)Gs follows a two-step process. Dictators first anchor their 
decisions according to their SVO (their moral intuitions), and in a second step they look for 
justifications to reduce their donations (Miller, 1999). Third, the effects of SVO are mediated 
by the perceived closeness of one’s relationship with an (anonymous) interaction partner. 
Fourth, it is possible to promote pro-social behavior by manipulating perceived interpersonal 
closeness.  
 
A two-step decision model in anonymous Dictator Games 
 
In line with dual-process theories of cognition (Chaiken and Trope, 1999), we 
hypothesized and found that when deciding on a donation amount in a DG, dictators engage in 
a two-step process. First, they anchor their allocations according to their moral intuitions, 
which are captured by the SVO concept and driven by perceptions of interpersonal closeness. 
This perception of social distance is, at least partly, responsible for SVO effects. In a second 
step, dictators adjust these anchored amounts in a self-serving direction. Imposing a cognitive 
load will stop them from proceeding further than step 1. If no cognitive load is imposed, 
predictive effects of SVO and interpersonal closeness are suppressed, because dictators 
engage in a search for justifications to reduce donation sizes, independent of perceived 
interpersonal closeness. We found that interpersonal closeness was not related to the number 
of coins donated in the no load condition of Study 3 and that manipulated closeness did not 




Other two-step models 
 
We decided to use the DG as a measure for cooperation because of its high ecological 
validity. Most real life social dilemmas do not provide clear indications about what would 
constitute a fair contribution. Additionally, an individual’s contribution in real life dilemmas is 
spread over such a large population that the benefit of a contribution for the self is negligible. 
These characteristics are present in the DG, unlike in resource or public good games, for 
example. Therefore we expect the decision process we uncovered in this paper to resemble 
the one in real life interdependence dilemmas more closely than the process guiding decisions 
in most other economic games. For example, Roch et al. (2000) found that in resource games, 
participants anchor on their fair share in a first step, and adjust their choices according to 
their SVO in a second step. Another anchor and adjustment process is found in van den bos et 
al. (2006). These authors found that people judge advantageous inequity to be more 
satisfying when cognitive processing is reduced, compared with the situation in which it is not 
reduced. They concluded that judging selfish advantage is automatic (step 1) whereas taking 
fairness concerns into account requires cognitive resources (step 2). However, they did 
acknowledge that the relation they found between preferences and fairness might be 
dependent on specific conditions and other models of preferences and their adjustment 
processes might be applicable in other situations. In this paper, we have found such an 
alternative model of preferences and adjustment. Several differences between their decision 
situation and ours may be responsible for the alternative decision making process. In their 
case, participants judged how satisfying a certain resource distribution was, whereas we asked 
participants to decide on such a distribution. These two are likely to activate different mental 
concepts and different types of evaluations. Allowing dictators to decide on the distribution 
provides them with a certain power, which participants in the studies by van den bos et al. 
(2006) did not have. Our intention was to provide insight into the decision making process in 
large-scale dilemmas. Two aspects of decision making in N-person real life dilemmas, the 
absence of objective indications for fair decisions, and the fact that benefits of contributions 
are negligible for the self, motivated our choice for the DG. We agree with van den bos et al. 
(2006) that future research should further specify models related to people’s preferences and 
their adjustment processes. It should search for the nature of the moderators that determine 
which of the models is more appropriate in a certain social dilemma situation.  
 
Generalization to real life dilemmas 
 
In our studies, we introduced an artificial manipulation to provoke intuitive judgments. 
One could wonder whether the predictive effect of SVOs, as a measurement of moral 
intuitions, generalizes to real life situations. We would argue it does, for several reasons. First, 
previous research has provided empirical proof, as SVOs have been used to predict choices  
  28
between traveling by public transport and taking one’s own car (Van Lange et al., 1998; van 
Vugt et al., 1996), willingness to pursue the goals of an organization one belongs to at a 
personal cost (Nauta et al., 2002), willingness to sacrifice in close relationships (Van Lange et 
al., 1997a), helping behavior (McClintock & Allison, 1989), and intentions to behave pro-
environmentally (Gärling et al., 2003; Joireman et al., 2001). Second, it has been argued that 
in most situations in our daily lives a large number of stimuli compete for our limited cognitive 
resources and behavior is therefore often executed rather automatically (Bargh & Thein, 1985; 
Bargh et al., 1994; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). Additionally, in interdependence situations we 
are often required to react very quickly, which promotes intuitive decision making. The 
decision whether to stop to talk to a street campaigner who, you know, will ask for a donation 
for charity, or decisions to comply with a request for a favor from a colleague are usually 
made in a split second, which precludes people from engaging in a reasoning process. Third, 
intuitions also guide behavior in an indirect way. They have an effect on information retrieved 
from memory during more elaborated reasoning (Bower, 1981) and in many cases facts are 
bended to fit beliefs rather than the other way around (Kunda, 1990; Most et al., 2001). 
Fourth, the transparent nature of gains and losses in the DG might be an artificial situation 
which stimulates contemplating the decision at hand. In real life situations pay-off structures 
might not be as clear, discouraging cognitive analysis.  
 
Public policy implications 
 
Our findings provide some public policy suggestions regarding the promotion of pro-
social or socially desirable decision making. Policy strategies could deal with either or both 
phases of the decision process. Regarding the intuitive phase, we propose three ways for 
action.  
 
First, our studies suggest that it is possible to manipulate people’s intuitive judgments 
in decision situations. SVOs seem to be one such dimension of moral intuitions. We 
manipulated these intuitions through influencing decision makers’ perceived closeness of their 
relationship with the interaction partner. Future research should examine whether this effect 
can be generalized to situations in which there is not a single interaction partner, but rather a 
whole community, like in real life social dilemmas. Furthermore, it should be examined 
whether SVO as a measure for moral intuitions predicts decisions in other domains. It would 
be interesting to investigate which are the optimal moral intuitions to trigger in specific areas 
of behavioral management. For example, in the context of promoting pro-environmental 
decision making one could use a social labeling technique to favor people to perceive 
themselves as a pro-environmental person (see Manuscript II). If it is possible to influence 
such self-perceptions, they are likely to translate into pro-environmental intuitions which 
affect subsequent environmental behavior.   
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Second, policy makers could attempt to influence the type of activated intuitions by 
manipulating interpretations of the decision situation. Spellman and Holyoak (1992) showed 
that making people apply a different metaphor to think about a situation is a good persuasion 
principle to influence moral decisions. For example: If Saddam Hussein is like Hitler, it follows 
that he must have been stopped. But if Iraq is Vietnam, it follows that the United States 
should not have become involved (Haidt, 2001). In the case of environmental issues, for 
example, educating people about the imminence of the threat of global warming could 
influence their intuitions. If people assume that since global temperature has fluctuated during 
history, they may conclude there is no reason for concern, or at least there is nothing we can 
do about it. Consequently, they will not develop moral intuitions motivating them to behave 
pro-environmentally. On the other hand, if these people learn that present CO2 level in the 
atmosphere are immensely higher compared to its usual range of fluctuation and that CO2 
levels are positively related to global temperature, they may be convinced that taking 
measures is urgent and develop an intuition to behave pro-environmentally. Especially if these 
environmental issues are framed in terms of personal gains and losses, individuals might be 
more motivated to engage in preservation efforts. 
 
Third, Moore and Loewenstein (2004) argued for setting up education and training 
methods which encourage strong social values to become internalized. This way moral values, 
rather than self-interest, would become automatized. These authors recognize, however, that 
in our Western society, this promises to be an arduous task. Progressively, self-interest has 
become to be embraced as a worthy goal. Because of confusing is with ought, the idea that 
people do maximize self-interest has developed in the idea that they should pursue self-
interest (Frank et al., 1993). People have become to perceive the pursuit of self-interest as a 
social norm rather than as egoism, a morally inferior choice (D. T. Miller, 1999).  
 
Policy efforts directed at step 2 of the decision process should make it more difficult to 
find justifications for adjusting one’s contribution in a self-serving direction. The use of social 
norms has shown to be efficient in this respect (Cialdini, 2003; Cialdini et al., 1990). For 
example, a convenient justification for not following one’s intuition to reduce alcohol 
consumption is the (mis)perception that others drink a lot as well (Lewis & Neighbors, 2006). 
A solution could be to (over)correct these perceived social norms. By showing that other 
people do not drink much at all, on average, this justification is removed. By communicating 
examples of other people pursuing the collective well-being, the availability of justifications for 
an individual not to do so is reduced.  






Whatever people say I am that’s what I am: 











In this paper, we present a procedure to apply the social labeling technique as a social 
marketing tool. With four studies, we tested its potential for the promotion of pro-
environmental consumer behavior. The procedure first provokes an environmentally friendly 
act and, subsequently, invites the target to attribute that behavior to his personal values, by 
communicating a social label. If successful, consumers will act upon the resulting self-
perception as an environmentally friendly person. Results indicated that social labeling is more 
successful when cognitive resources are distracted, either at the moment of processing the 
label, or at the moment of making decisions related to the content of the label. Second, we 
found that the social label not merely guides subsequent decisions, but motivates people to 




Assuring a sustainable future requires us to use earth’s resources cautiously. 
Consumer’s choices and post-consumption behaviors have a considerable impact on, for 
example, energy use, toxic emissions, and waste production (Daly, 1996). A continued study 
of behavioral management techniques to promote pro-environmental consumer behavior is 
warranted.  
 
Several researchers have identified the decision whether or not to behave pro-
environmental as a social dilemma (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; van Vugt et al., 1996; Wiener & 
Doescher, 1991). Choosing to conserve the environment is considered to be a pro-social 
behavior because it serves the interest of society in the long term. On the other hand, 
behavioral costs associated with this type of actions, like money, time, effort, and 
inconvenience (Follows & Jobber, 2000; Pieters, 1989; Pieters et al., 1998; Thøgersen, 1994a) 
tempt individuals to make selfish choices. It is the responsibility and the challenge of social 
marketers to persuade individuals to act in the benefit of society. In the social marketing 
tradition, the strategies chosen for this aim typically rely on the assumption that it is 
necessary to provoke some active contemplation of behavioral alternatives (Andreasen, 1995). 
Wiener and Doescher (1991) propose, for example, that consumers need to be convinced that 
the collective goal is worth pursuing and that it is likely to materialize. Further, they claim that 
social marketers should emphasize the importance of each individual’s contribution. However, 
the traditional social marketing approach has not always met with unequivocal success. We 
propose another, complementary strategy, which consists of subtly activating the right 
(environmental) values and goals at the appropriate time. We will present the social labeling 
technique, which builds on this principle, as a promising method for promoting pro-
environmental conduct. In four studies, we tested the possibilities and scope of this procedure. 
 
The Traditional Social Marketing Approach 
 
Social marketers generally use two types of persuasion strategies: the provision of 
incentives, and of information that should motivate the target audience to contemplate the 
consequences of their behavioral options. Both strategies have their merits, but are associated 
with possible backlash effects. 
 
The provision of incentives has proven its effect in the short term. However, it has 
been argued that it is associated with two types of drawbacks. First, incentives are costly and 
their effect tends to disappear as soon as the incentive system is withdrawn. Second, 
providing incentives to individuals who were already intrinsically motivated to display the 
requested behavior may undermine this intrinsic motivation (Cameron & Pierce, 1994; Frey &  
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Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Thøgersen, 1994b). In that case, withdrawing the 
incentive system may even result in a drop of the occurrence of the desired behavior below 
the initial baseline (Kahan, 1997).  
 
Informative, argument-based pro-environmental messages are an essential tool to 
educate and sensitize a target audience on important issues. Caution is required, however, as 
research literature documents several mechanisms through which these messages might 
backfire. First, targets may show psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Reich & 
Robertson, 1979); people are motivated to counter a perceived threat to their freedom of 
personal choice by doing the opposite of what the persuasion message suggests. Second, 
messages using a fear appeal aim at motivating people to think about possible disastrous 
consequences of non-ecological behavior. Provoking extreme fear, however, might lead to a 
process called fear control. Extreme fear is an aversive state, which individuals may try to 
evade by minimizing the perceived risks through source derogation, defensive denial, or 
wishful thinking. Successful fear reduction strategies will lead to a decreased likelihood of 
engaging in corrective action to avoid the undesirable consequences (Witte & Allen, 2000). 
Third, social marketing messages discouraging non-desirable behavior may hold a “descriptive 
norm meta-message” (Cialdini, 2003). Saying that “a problematic behavior needs urgent 
attention because it is very prevalent” implies that it is a common behavior. Research on 
descriptive norms (Cialdini et al., 1990) suggests that simply doing what everyone else is 
doing is often preferred over doing the right thing. Therefore such a message, ironically, might 
be interpreted as a justification to keep on engaging in the undesirable behavior. Fourth, these 
messages may elicit a state of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957), as people experience a 
contradiction between what they think they should be doing and their actual behavior. People 
might reduce dissonance by acting upon the (pro-environmental) value. However, cognitive 
dissonance may be resolved via other routes that do not result in the desired behavioral 
change. The least effortful way to reduce dissonance is not to change behavior, but to 
assimilate one’s behavioral and moral values regarding environmentalism to the (less pro-
environmental) behavior (Albarracín & McNatt, 2005). Alternatively, avoiding dissonance may 
even be achieved by simply ignoring the request. Fifth, making people think about why they 
should act ecological, makes them think about why they should not as well (Warlop et al., 
2003, p. 205). Making people think about public benefits will be likely to make them consider 
the private costs of the same behavior as well (Albarracín & Wyer, 2001). Additionally, this will 
also lead to thinking about the private benefits of alternatives. As private costs and benefits 
are more salient than public costs and benefits (Rothschild, 1979), such a deliberation process 
is likely to end with an individual choosing the selfish option (i.e., the non-environmentally 




Values versus Behavior 
 
Because of the aforementioned reasons, promoting pro-environmental (consumer) 
behavior has proven to be a tough task with limited success. Notwithstanding, social 
marketers have been successful at creating awareness of environmental problems and many 
people have adopted ecological preservation values (EC, 2005). Thus has developed a value-
behavior gap (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002; Mainieri et al., 1997; Oskamp et al., 1991). It 
seems that the traditional social marketing actions can not have more ambition than to 
cultivate these preservation values. Another approach, then, is necessary to translate these 
values into preservation behavior. 
 
Many consumer choices are executed as part of a continuous stream of behaviors which 
are executed fairly automatically, based on minimal informational input (Alba et al., 1991; 
Warlop et al., 2003). We consider low-involvement choices with an environmental impact to 
be no exception. In a decision situation, it will be the value that is temporarily most salient 
and perceived to be relevant that determines the behavioral choice. Construal level theory 
(Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2000) predicts that positive beliefs about a goal 
or value are more readily accessible in long-term decisions, whereas negative beliefs related 
to that goal (e.g., the difficulty to obtain it) predominate in short-term decisions. When 
challenged to contemplate the environmental impact of behavior alternatives by social 
marketing messages, one thinks abstractly about future behavior. In this case, positive beliefs 
related to conservation behavior are likely to be salient. This may lead to making personal 
resolutions to act upon this value in the future. In the here and now of making a decision, 
however, the benefits of the concrete, lower-order goal of serving the self-interest is likely to 
be more salient than the higher-order preservation goal. In a heuristic decision process, based 
on minimal information input, these proximal and salient personal consequences are more 
likely to be spontaneously on the top of one’s mind. An alternative social marketing approach, 
then, could consist of making the relevant (pro-environmental) thoughts more likely to be 
accessible at the moment of decision making.  
 
We will test the potential of the social labeling technique for this aim. People prefer their 
actions to be consistent with their self-perceptions (Wells & Iyengar, 2005), and therefore we 
suggest that activating consumers’ self-perceptions as environmentally friendly people should 









Social labeling is a persuasion technique that consists of providing a person with a 
statement about his or her personality or values (i.e., the social label) in an attempt to 
provoke behavior that is consistent with the label. The technique is believed to rely on a self-
perception process and the fact that people’s (interpretation of) past behavior guides future 
action (Albarracín & McNatt, 2005; Burger & Caldwell, 2003; Ouellette & Wood, 1998; Tybout 
& Yalch, 1980). According to Bem’s (1972) self-perception theory, people get to know 
themselves much like they develop a perception of values and traits of others: by observing 
behavior and attributing it internal or to external influences. When they “see” themselves 
engaging in a certain act, for no apparent external reasons like incentives or social pressure, 
that behavior is internally attributed. It informs the individual about his or her personality 
traits and values. We propose that social labels, provided by others, can be an important 
source of information about an individual’s traits and values as well, and can guide future 
decisions (Strenta & DeJong, 1981). According to this reasoning, environmental decisions are 
based on the implicit question “Am I the type of person who usually chooses the pro-
environmental option?” (Burger & Caldwell, 2003; Vaidyanathan & Praveen, 2005). Providing a 
label offers an appealing answer to that question, as it involves minimal cognitive effort.  
 
An early example of the effect of social labels is offered by Miller, Brickman and Bolen 
(1975). Describing a group of fifth-graders as tidy was more efficient in making them keep 
their classroom free of litter than an explicit plea for tidiness. Similarly, Allen (1982) showed 
that labeling a certain social group (“American consumers are willing participants in solving 
the energy problem”) in television adds lead to increased intentions to engage in energy-
efficient consumption compared to a persuasive appeal. Labeling has shown to be especially 
effective when (1) it follows recent behavioral evidence, as people seek confirmation for their 
attributions before changing their attitudes (Carol A.  Scott & Yalch, 1980), and (2) it is 
consistent with the initial self-schema of the target (Tybout & Yalch, 1980). Kraut (1973) 
showed, for example, that individuals who were labeled as generous after making a donation 
were more likely to donate to a second charity two weeks later, than those who were not 
labeled. Tybout and Yalch (1980) provided false feedback on a survey, which supposedly 
measured interest in politics and elections. Participants, who heard they scored above 
average, were more likely to actually vote in an election a week later, than those said to be 
scoring average, but this effect only showed for participants who already had an initial voter 
self-schema. This led them to conclude that “strategies to influence behavior, like labeling, are 
likely to be particularly effective in situations where individuals have an initial interest in the 
focal behavior” (Tybout & Yalch, 1980, p. 412). We indicated before that research has 
observed a growing interest in environmental consumption over the past years (EC, 2005). 
Most people, therefore, have a self-schema, which includes the value of conserving the  
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e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  l a b e l i n g  s h ould be an effective technique to promote 
environmental consumer behavior. 
 
An Alternative Labeling Procedure 
 
The foot-in-the-door procedure, which also relies on a self-perception process, requires 
that individuals are targeted personally (Carol A. Scott, 1977). This limits the size of the 
audience that can be reached. In this paper, we will examine whether labeling is applicable in 
a mass-media approach. The increase in the size of the audience that can be addressed is at 
the expense of a loss of control and flexibility in addressing the individual. Unlike the foot-in-
the-door procedure, which permits individuals to draw their own conclusions from manipulated 
behavior, a label actively proposes a certain (re-)attribution of previous behavior. 
  
Allen (1982) included labeling messages in video ads, which targeted an entire target 
community at once. The ads referred to certain energy conservation behaviors most 
Americans engaged in, like switching off lights and turning down thermostats. This allowed 
him to link the label (“American consumers are willing participants in solving the energy 
problem”) to previous behavioral evidence, at least for those who actually engage in these 
behaviors. We propose a modified procedure, with a stronger link between the label and 
recent behavioral evidence, which should add to the strength of its effect, as discussed above 
(Carol A.  Scott & Yalch, 1980). Additionally, the consumer might feel more personally 
addressed, which should increase the feeling that the label applies to him or her. 
 
In a first step of the alternative procedure, the consumer is provoked to perform a 
certain pro-environmental act. This could be, for example, the purchase of an environmentally 
friendly variety of a product, like bio-products or propellant-free deodorant. In some cases this 
will require some type of external motivation, like a price promotion. In other cases, the 
consumer might simply prefer the environmentally friendly product, because of other product 
features than its environmental friendliness. For example, consumers might prefer the smell of 
a certain deodorant which happens to be propellant-free. In a second step, a social label is 
provided which attributes the purchase to the consumers’ environmental values. For example, 
one could print a message on the packaging (e.g., “[brand X] – For those who care about their 
environment”). This procedure allows for repeated exposure of the label to the consumer, 
each time he or she uses the product. As explained before, the social label informs the 
individual about his or her (pro-environmental) personality traits and values, in this case 
about environmentally friendliness. It invites the consumer to attribute the ecological purchase 
to their value of caring for the environment. In this paper, we want to examine whether it is 
possible to provoke an internal re-attribution of an externally motivated behavior. Internally  
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Previous demonstrations of the labeling technique, in which the label followed a 
manipulated behavior, were mostly extensions of the foot-in-the-door procedure. After a first, 
modest request for help, targets who were labeled as helpful showed more compliance with a 
second, larger request for help than those who did not receive such a label (Crano & Sivacek, 
1982; Gorassini & Olson, 1995; Hornik, 1988; Stimpson & Waranusuntikule, 1987). In the 
mentioned studies, attributing the helping behavior in the first request to the self is very 
plausible. Even without receiving the label, participants would have attributed their compliance 
to their helpfulness. The label merely confirmed this interpretation and made it more explicit. 
In our case, however, the social label proposes a re-attribution of a first behavior (Snyder & 
Uranowitz, 1978). Referring to our example, rather than attributing the provoked purchase to 
the lower price or the superiority of a product, the consumer is invited to attribute the choice 
to his or her pro-environmental values. We will test the labeling procedure’s potential at 
convincing consumers to re-attribute their initial behavior. 
 
Consumers, who are aware of the actual determinants of their purchase, might realize 
the label is some sort of manipulation attempt, and reject its content (Burger, 1999). In order 
to maximize the probability that the target accepts and acts upon the label, it should be 
communicated in such a way that it minimizes activation of persuasion knowledge (Friestad & 
Wright, 1994).  In the case that information processing is constrained because people are 
under cognitive load, under time pressure, or distracted, it is harder to engage in such 
reflection (R. S. Baron et al., 1973; Gilbert et al., 1990). This implies that social labeling 
messages may have more impact when they are accompanied by some form of distraction 
(Bither, 1972; Festinger & Maccoby, 1964; Kumkale & Albarracín, 2004; Rosenblatt, 1966). 
Campbell and Kirmani (2000) observed that when their participants were cognitively “busy” 
(i.e., when they had to perform other simultaneous and cognitive demanding tasks), they 
were more prone to judge a salesperson giving a promotional talk as sincere, and thus be 
sensitive to his arguments. This effect even holds when the ulterior (persuasive) motive of the 
salesperson is highly salient (Bosmans & Warlop, 2005). This suggests that if, at the moment 
that the target receives the social label, cognitive resources are limited or directed elsewhere, 
the probability of accepting the label as a truthful self-description would increase, and hence 
would the impact of this information on subsequent decisions.  
 
These effects might be accounted for by the literature on mindlessness in consumer 
decision making (e.g., Cialdini, 2001; Dijksterhuis et al., 2005; Dolinski et al., 2002; Langer,  
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1992). Research in this area proposes that complying with a request as a result of social 
influence techniques is often a rather automatic response, which is especially prone to occur 
under conditions of relative mindlessness. For example, based on dual process theories 
(Chaiken & Trope, 1999), Fennis, Das, and Pruyn (2004) showed that the Disrupt-Then-
Reframe technique (Davis & Knowles, 1999) works because the disruption acts as a distractor. 
It induces mindlessness and reduces counter-argumentation. When cognitive resources are 
scarce, people are not capable of processing message characteristics carefully, and tend to 
rely on peripherical cues, like a social label (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
 
It seems reasonable to assume that these distraction conditions apply in the daily 
consumer context. Both the moments of purchasing and of using products, which carry the 
labeling message, are embedded in a continuous stream of mental activities. Either when 
coming across the social label while paying at the cash register and trying to remember where 
the car is parked, or when going over that day’s appointments while applying deodorant in the 
morning, our limited cognitive resources are directed elsewhere. We expect the labeling 
procedure to work in common, cognitively demanding circumstances.  
 
Overview of the Studies 
 
In a first study we tested our alternative labeling procedure, and verified whether 
cognitive distractions facilitate the labeling effect. In Study 2 we tested our explanation for the 
distraction effect more directly: distraction prevents the activation of persuasion knowledge. It 
reduces contemplation on the veracity of the self-description the label provides. In this study, 
we also tested whether the social label merely acts as a guide for future decisions or whether 
it also provokes a re-attribution of the initial pro-environmental behavior. We went on to test 
whether the labeling effect generalizes to situations in which the cognitive impairment occurs 
during choice making choices rather than during the exposure to the label (Study 3) and to 




Allen (1982) tested the potential of social labeling for mass communication application. 
Like in that study, we compared the effect of providing a social label with that of a content-
based persuasion message, which communicates arguments in favor of pro-environmental 
behavior. We predicted a superior effect of the social label compared to content-based 
persuasion messages. Rather than using a general label, addressing a community as a whole 
(Allen, 1982), we applied a more individualized approach which links the label to recent 
behavioral evidence. To do so, we used a task that provokes a pro-environmental choice that 
is, however, not driven by pro-environmental values but by a subtle external motivation. The  
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subsequently provided label suggested an internal re-attribution of that choice to personally 
held pro-environmental values. We hypothesized that the social label would be effective if the 
participants’ cognitive resources are impaired or directed elsewhere at the moment of 
processing it. If they are not distracted, however, we predict that elaborate processing of the 
content of the social label will lead to its dismissal. Therefore we expect no effect of the social 
label in the condition where participants are not distracted. 
 
Method 
Participants and Design 
 
One hundred and one undergraduate students (40 male, 61 female) were paid 6 € for 
participation in this study, which took about 50 minutes. Upon arrival in our lab, in groups 
from five to eight, they were seated in front of a computer screen in a semi-closed cubicle.  
The experimental design included two between-subject factors. These were communication 
type (label, explicit plea, and control) and cognitive load (load and no load). 
 
Procedure and materials 
 
TV-choice task 
 First, participants completed a TV-choice task on paper (adapted from Verplanken & 
Holland, 2002). This task was meant to provoke an environmentally friendly choice. We 
constructed a list of seven TV’s, which were rated on seven attributes (Image quality, image 
quality in sunlight, sound quality, remote control quality, ecological aspects, ease of 
programming and speed of changing channels). This information was represented in a 7 by 7 
brand-by-attribute matrix, see Figure 3. In the rows of the matrix the seven TV’s were listed, 
represented with letters from A to G. The seven attributes were listed in the columns of the 
matrix. One of five possible symbols (--, -, 0, +, ++) evaluated every TV on every attribute. 
Above the choice matrix a short legend explained what the attributes referred to. The 
‘ecological aspects’ attribute was explained to refer to electricity consumption and the degree 
to which the TV-set set contains polluting components and (non)recyclable materials. TV-set 
‘C’ was superior on both image and sound quality. These dimensions were pre-tested (N = 54) 
as the most important features in the choice for a TV-set. Consistently, all participants chose 
this TV. Importantly, TV C was also rated best on ‘ecological aspects’ (++). This way, 





Figure 3.  The TV-choice task 
 
 
Manipulations of communication type and cognitive load 
Subsequently, participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions. Those 
in the labeling condition received feedback on their choice. This feedback communicated the 
social label. Instructions that appeared on the screen explained that the TV-choice task was 
used by an important consumer organization to identify different segments of consumers. For 
every possible TV-choice, a description was given of the typical consumer choosing that TV-
set. The description for the specific TV a participant chose was highlighted. For TV C, the 
description said that the typical consumer choosing this option was ‘very concerned with the 
environment, and ecologically conscious’. A second group, assigned to the explicit plea 
condition, read an explicit plea for ecologically conscious consumer behavior. Additionally, it 
provided some tips for reducing waste production and efficient recycling. A third, control group 
did not get any information in this phase.  
 
Within each of the three groups, half of the participants were assigned to the cognitive 
load condition. The cognitive load task consisted of remembering a six-digit number (Gilbert et 
al., 1988; Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). Participants were instructed to do so after entering the 
TV-set of their choice and before getting feedback. After reading either the social label, the 
explicit plea, or nothing at all, they were asked to recall the number they were supposed to 
remember. Five participants (5 %) failed to reproduce the correct number, and they were 
discarded from further analysis. 
 
Dependent measure: the product choice task 
After 15 minutes of unrelated filler tasks, participants completed a product choice task. 
This task consisted of making 10 product choices. Participants were presented with 10 product 
pairs: five filler pairs and five critical ones. In each critical pair, one product was a more 
environmentally friendly but more expensive alternative of the other. We asked participants to 
indicate which product they would pick if they were to purchase them now. The critical product 
categories were cookies (differing in the amount of plastic used for wrapping), kitchen paper, 
deodorants, (energy-efficient) lamps, and detergents. For eight product categories, the price 














A  + –  – +  0  0 ++ – 
B  – –  0  + +  +  –  0  + 
C  ++ 0  +  + ++ +  + 
D  +  – –  – 0  –  + ++ 
E  – – 0  ++  + + – 
F  ++ –  0  0 –  – 0  – 
G  0  + +  – –  +  –  0  +  
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of the more environmental product was 1.05 € whereas the less environmental product cost 
0.95 €. For the lamps, the prices were 1.50 € and 1.30 €, respectively, and for detergents, 
they were 1.40 € and 1.30 €, respectively. These prices were pre-tested in a different sample 
of the same student population (N = 34), by informing participants about the shop value of a 
certain object and asking them which (higher) price they would be willing to pay for a more 
ecological variant of that product. We used the median price mentioned for the ecological 
products in the choice task. The 10 product choices appeared in random order on the screen. 
We counted the number of environmentally friendly choices participants made on the five 




We conducted a three (communication type: label, explicit plea, and control) by two 
(cognitive load) ANOVA. This revealed a significant interaction between communication type 
and cognitive load (F(2, 90) = 5.77; p < .01), and a marginally significant main effect of 
communication type (F(2, 90) = 2.86; p = .06), see Figure 4. As expected, planned contrasts 
revealed that within the no load condition, communication type had no effect (F < 1), whereas 
in the load condition, it had (F(2, 42) = 6.61, p < .01). Tukey pairwise comparisons showed 
that, under cognitive load, participants in the social label condition (M = 3.67) made more 
environmental choices than those in the explicit plea (M = 2.56, p < .02) and the control 
condition (M = 2.29, p < .01). We found no differences between the explicit plea and control 
group within the load condition (F< 1). 
 
 Within the social label condition, cognitive load (M = 3.67) led to more environmental 
choices than the absence of load (M = 2.53, F(1, 90) = 9.44, p < .01). Neither in the explicit 
plea condition (F(1, 90) = 1.44, p = .23) nor in the control condition (F < 1), we observed a 













































Figure 4.  Number of environmental choices as a result of communication type and mental 





We found evidence for cognitive distractions moderating the impact of a labeling 
procedure. Processing the label while cognitive resources are directed elsewhere resulted in 
using it as a guide in subsequent decisions. When cognitive resources were not limited, the 
social label did not have any effect. We assume that cognitive distractions, such as load, 
prevent the activation of persuasion knowledge, because it impairs reflection on the actual 
reason of the TV-choice. If that is true, then motivating participants to reflect on the actual 
reasons for the purchase, after receiving the social label when mentally distracted, should 
suppress the labeling effect. We will test this hypothesis in the next Study. The content-based 




The aim of this study was to replicate the labeling effect of Study 1, and to provide 
additional insight in the process. We tested the hypothesis that cognitive distractions prevent 
the activation of persuasion knowledge because they impair reflection on the actual reason of 
the TV-choice. We used the same procedure as in Study 1, and added a factor. We asked half 
of the participants to reflect on the actual reasons for choosing the TV-set that they did. We 
asked them to indicate, after completing the TV-choice task and the subsequent manipulation, 
for each of the seven attributes on which the TV’s were rated, how important it had been in 
making the TV-choice. Each attribute was given an importance-score on a 25-point scale. 
Additionally, we asked the other half of participants to do the same, but only after the 
dependent measure was completed. This allowed us to verify the extent of the impact of the 
social label: Is it merely a guide for subsequent decisions, or does it provoke an internal (re- 
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)attribution of the TV-choice? We dropped the explicit plea condition from the design, because 




Participants and design 
 
One hundred fifty-eight undergraduate students received 6 € for participation in the 
experimental session, which lasted about 50 minutes. The experimental design included 3 
between subject variables. These were communication type (social label versus control), 
cognitive load (load versus no load), and reflection (reflection on TV-choice versus no 
reflection). 
 
Materials and procedure 
 
Upon arrival in the lab, in groups of five to eight, participants were requested to take a 
seat in front of a computer screen in a semi-closed cubicle. First, they completed the TV-
choice task. Four participants (2.5 %) did not pick the TV-set which scored superior on image 
and sound quality and were discarded from further analysis. Then we manipulated 
communication type and cognitive load in an identical way as we did in Study 1. Directly after 
these manipulations, half of the participants were asked to indicate to which degree each of 
the seven attributes, on which the TV-sets were rated, had determined their TV-choice, on a 
25-point scale (ranging from not important at all to very important). We reasoned that this 
task elicits reflection on the initial TV-choice and would allow participants, who received the 
label under load, to realize what the actual reason was to choose the TV-set they chose. After 
15 minutes of unrelated filler tasks, participants completed the product choice task. Finally, 
those participants, who did not indicate the importance of the seven attributes before, did so 






 We conducted a two (communication type: label versus control) by two (cognitive 
load: load versus no load) by two (reflection on TV-choice versus no reflection) ANOVA. This 
resulted in a significant three-way interaction (F(1, 146) = 5.16, p < .03) ), see Figure 5. We 
replicated the results of Study 1 in the no reflection condition (F(1, 146) = 8.84, p < .01), see 
left panel of Figure 5. Here, the social label produced more environmentally friendly choices 
















































































= 9.07, p < .01). In the control condition, we did not observe an effect of cognitive load (F(1, 
146) = 1.28, p = .26). Within the load condition, those participants who were labeled made 
more ecological choices than those who were not (F(1, 146) = 13.49, p < .01). Within the no 
load condition, there was no effect of communication type, F < 1.  
 
As expected, allowing participants to reflect on their TV-choice suppressed the labeling 
effect. Within the reflection on TV-choice condition, the main effects and the interaction 













Figure 5.  Number of environmental choices made. The no reflection condition replicated Study 1, 
left panel. Reflection suppressed the labeling effect, right panel (Study 2) 
 
Ratings of Attribute-importance in the TV-choice 
 
 We calculated the relative importance attached to the ecology attribute, for those 
participants who indicated the importance of each of seven attributes at the end of the 
experiment. We divided the rating given to this attribute by the sum of the ratings given to 
the seven attributes. An increase in the importance attached to the ecology attribute, would 
mean that the manipulation was successful at suggesting a re-attribution of the TV-choice. We 
found an interaction effect (F(1, 76) = 4.59, p < .04) , see Figure 6. Within the labeling group, 
those who received the distracting load task rated the ecology attribute as more important for 
their TV-choice (M = .15) than those who did not (M = .10, F(1, 76) = 4.41, p < .04). Within 
the control group, there was no effect of cognitive load (F < 1). Under cognitive load, those 
who received the label rated the ecology dimension as more important than those who were 
not labeled (M = .10, F(1, 76) = 6.39, p < .02). Without load, there was no effect of 

























































This study added more insight in the process of social labeling in two ways. First, we 
obtained support for our hypothesis that cognitive load facilitates the labeling effect because it 
reduces the activation of persuasion knowledge. Processing the label under load prevented the 
participants initially to question the truthfulness of the label. By making them reflect on their 
TV-choice immediately after receiving the label, however, we allowed the participants to 
correct for the re-attribution the label proposed. Second, the impact of the label appeared to 
extend beyond a mere self-perception process, to an active re-attribution of the initial TV-
choice. The label influences the interpretation of previous behavior, and makes environmental 
values more salient (Alba et al., 1991; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). Several theories predict 
that the salience of certain values increases the probability of acting upon them (Albarracín & 
Wyer, 2001; Bem, 1972; Schwarz et al., 1991). We have shown that it is possible to increase 
the salience of a certain value, in this case environmental friendliness, by suggesting to 




For practical purposes, it is important to know whether a social label can influence 
targets’ behavior, even if it has been processed with full attention. We explore this possibility 
in this and the following study. Work on assimilation and contrast effects (Martin et al., 1990; 
Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1997) showed that whether possible counter-arguments regarding an 
issue will be retrieved later on, is determined by the availability of cognitive resources at the 
moment of retrieval. Findings of Schwarz and Bless (1992) and Meyers-Levy and Tybout 
(1997) claim that the same factors determine the effect of a contextual cue (e.g., the label), 
regardless of whether this influence occurs at encoding or at judgment (when retrieving the  
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cue). Therefore we predict that the label will be effective if participants are cognitively 
distracted at the moment of decision making, even if they processed the label with full 
attention. The persuasion knowledge that was activated at the moment of processing the label 
will not be recalled at the moment of using the label as a guide to make decisions. We verify 
this hypothesis in the present study. We replicate Study 1, changing one aspect in the design. 
In this study the cognitive load task is situated at the moment of making ecology-related 




Participants and design 
 
Eighty-six undergraduates participated in this study, and were paid 6 € for participation 
in an experimental session, which lasted about 50 minutes. We manipulated two between-
subjects factors: communication-type (label versus control) and cognitive load (load versus no 
load). 
 
Procedure and materials 
 
First, participants completed the TV-choice task and were randomly assigned to one of 
two conditions. One group received the social label as feedback on their choice and the other 
group did not get any information. Six participants (7 %) did not choose the superior TV-set 
and were discarded from further analysis. After 15 minutes of unrelated filler tasks, 
participants completed the product choice task we used in Study 1 and 2. Orthogonally with 
the communication manipulation, we asked half of the participants to remember a six-digit 




An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction between communication and cognitive load 
(F(1, 76) = 6.87, p < .01), see figure 7. As predicted, participants in the labeling condition 
who made their choices under load (M = 3.15), chose more environmental products than 
those who were not cognitively distracted (M = 1.91, F(1, 76) = 8.93, p < .01). In the control 
condition we found no effect of cognitive load (F<1). In the load condition, labeling (M = 3.15) 
led to making more ecological choices than in the control condition (M = 1.77, F(1, 76) = 


















































As we predicted, distracting cognitive resources at the moment of making purchase 
decisions, allowed the labeling effect to emerge. This suggests that when cognitive resources 
are available, consumers recall the persuasion knowledge associated with the information 
provided by the label. Under load this recall seems to be suppressed. This finding implies that 
a labeling message should work, unless the consumer is fully focused on the task at hand, 
both while processing the label and while purchasing a product. If at any of both moments 
attention is distracted, persuasion knowledge is either not activated, or not recalled, and the 
social label will influence purchase decisions. We indicated before that most situations in our 
daily lives feature a large number of stimuli competing for our limited cognitive resources. 
Therefore we argue that cases, in which consumers are fully focused on both critical occasions 




In this study, we tested whether the previous results would generalize to other types of 
cognitive distractions. Research on the relative impact of product attributes, differing in 
salience, on consumer decision making, has shown that both cognitive load (Shiv et al., 2005) 
and repeated decision making (Bruyneel et al., 2006) have similar effects. These situational 
aspects decrease the relative impact of cognitive product features (e.g., healthiness) on 
subsequent choices, through a process called ego-depletion (Vohs & Baumeister, 2004). This 
suggests that repeated choice making is an alternative procedure that reduces the availability 
of cognitive resources. In this study, we verified whether repeated choice making has a similar 
effect as cognitive load on the impact of the social label. We hypothesized that making 





Participants and design 
 
One hundred fifty-seven undergraduate students (65 men and 91 women) participated 
in the experimental session, which lasted about 50 minutes, in return for 6 €. We included one 
between subjects factor (communication type: label versus explicit plea) and one within 
subjects factor (three decision rounds) in the design. 
   
Procedure and materials 
 
Manipulation 
Like in previous studies, participants started with the TV-choice task. Eight participants 
(5.7 %) were discarded from analysis for not choosing the superior set. After choosing their 
preferred TV-set, respondents were randomly assigned to one of two communication type 
conditions. As explained, we expected that repeated choice making would constitute a strain 
on participants’ cognitive resources. Therefore, like in circumstances with cognitive load, we 
expected the impact of the social label to emerge after repeated choices. We wondered 
whether a similar effect would show in case of an explicit plea. After all, the flaws associated 
with such an approach, which we discussed in the introduction, like reactance (Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981), cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and thinking about costs of the 
promoted behavior (Warlop et al., 2003), are all the result of cognitive elaboration on the 
information the plea provided. Perhaps the repeated decision would decrease the salience of 
these ponderings. To constitute a conservative test of our hypothesis, we therefore selected 
the explicit plea condition as a control condition in this study. 
 
Repeated choices public good dilemma 
After fifteen minutes of unrelated filler tasks, participants completed the dependent 
measure. We constructed a repeated choices public good dilemma, which was framed as an 
ecological task. We asked participants to imagine that they were to buy 10 bags of potato 
chips for a party. The potato chips alternatives were either packed in conventional or in bio-
degradable bags. Participants had to indicate how many items of each type they would 
purchase (summing to 10). Instructions on the computer screen explained that the bio-
degradable bags were more expensive (1.35 € versus 1.10 €), because they had a lower 
market-share. An increased demand would lead to lowering of the prices for this type of 
packaging. A group of eight participants played the public good game. They were told that if 
the group as a whole would buy a sufficient number of bio-degradable bags, the price would 
drop in the next round of the game, in which they had to buy 10 more bags. In total,  
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participants played three such rounds. We did not specify the number of bio-degradable bags 
they collectively needed to buy to produce the price drop. Had we done so, most participants 
would choose the “equal cost share” strategy, stating that everyone contributes his or her fair 
share to obtain the public good (in this case, the price drop) (Bagnoli & McKee, 1991). After 
each round, all participants received bogus feedback, which indicated that the public good was 




We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with one between subjects variable 
(communication type: social label versus explicit plea) and the three rounds of the public good 
game as a within subjects variable. These rounds constitute the repeated decisions. We found 
significant differences between rounds (F(2, 294) = 48.94, p < .01), see Figure 8. In round 2 
(M = 6.82) participants chose more bio-degradable bag than in round 1 (M = 5.23, F(1, 147) 
= 40.08, p < .01), and in round 3 (M = 7.86) more than in round 2 (F(1, 147) = 17.47, p < 
.01). This is evidence for the fact that participants were motivated to achieve the public good 
(Rondeau et al., 1999).  More importantly, we found a significant interaction between 
communication type and decision round, F(2, 294) = 5.89, p < .01. In round 1 and 2, we did 
not find differences between communication conditions (F’s < 1). In round 3 however, 
participants who had received the social label, chose more bio-degradable bags (M = 8.65) 
than those in the explicit plea condition (M = 7.06, F(1, 147) = 9.30, p < .01). In the labeling 
condition, participants increased their share of bio-degradable bags (M = 8.65) compared to 
round 2 (M = 6.90, F(1, 147) = 23.75), but this was not the case for participants in the 























































The depleting nature of repeated choice making (Bruyneel et al., 2006) increased the 
impact of the social label as a guide for environmental decision making. Initially, participants 
chose, on average, a fifty-fifty distribution between traditional and bio-degradable bags. As 
this proved not to be sufficient for achieving the public good (i.e. the price drop), in round 2 
the share of bio-degradable bags increased, indicating participants were motivated to achieve 
the public good, at a personal expense. In round three, the distribution remained constant in 
the explicit plea, whereas in the label condition the share of bio-degradable bags further 
increased. The results in this third round are comparable with those of the cognitive load 
conditions of the previous studies. This suggests that the suppression of the persuasion 
knowledge effect generalizes to other circumstances which distract cognitive resources. As 
conditions of cognitive load or repeated choosing are prevalent in our daily lives, this finding 
suggests the social labeling procedure is widely applicable.  
 
Findings in the explicit plea group in the first and the fourth study, add to the 
observation made in the introduction, that providing people with ‘food for thought’ is not an 
efficient strategy, certainly in domains where the attitude towards the behavior (e.g. paying a 
higher price for the same functionality) is more negative than the attitude towards the 
overarching value (i.e. being an environmentally conscious consumer). We did not observe a 




Our findings indicate that social labeling is a promising tool, applicable in mass-media 
contexts. We proposed a new procedure, in which the label directly follows recent behavioral 
evidence. First, targets are provoked to engage in a pro-environmental behavior. 
Subsequently, the label proposes the target to attribute that behavior to his or her personality 
and values. We tested the effect of this procedure on ecological behavior, although it should 
be equally applicable to other areas of social desirable behavior, like health behavior, voting 
and helping behavior. 
 
Social labeling proved effective when cognitive resources were constrained, either at the 
time of the communication or at the time of the decision. We argued that this requirement is 
the rule, rather than the exception in real life, since the majority of our daily activity is part of 
a stream of continuous and overlapping mental activities. We further argued that the effect of 
cognitive distractions is due to the suppression of persuasion knowledge activation. Our 
findings contribute to the literature on mindlessness in consumer decision making (e.g., 
Cialdini, 2001; Dijksterhuis et al., 2005). For example, Fennis, Das, and Pruyn (2004) showed  
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that the Disrupt-Then-Reframe technique (Davis & Knowles, 1999) works because the 
disruption acts as a distractor. It induces mindlessness and reduces counter-argumentation. 
Albarracín and Kumkale (2003) showed that extraneous affect does not influence decisions 
when level of processing is high, because people then recognize that the affect is not relevant 
for the decision at hand. In line with these findings, our data showed that favoring mindless, 
automatic processing of a social label rendered targets more vulnerable to the persuasion 
attempt. The implication seems to be that unconscious processing is less critical and unable to 
reject information as untrue or invalid, compared to conscious processing (e.g., Gilbert et al., 
1990). The unconscious seems to accept just everything. Future research on this topic is 
warranted.  
 
Previous research has suggested that such subtle techniques, requiring minimal 
conscious thought, may be more effective on the longer term effect than campaigns provoking 
people to explicitly contemplate consequences of behavioral alternatives by providing 
arguments (Albarracín & Wyer, 2001). Albarracin & McNatt (2005) studied the effects of past 
behavior on attitudes towards university policies. Participants were led to believe that they 
had unconsciously supported or opposed a social policy. This feedback had direct effects on 
attitudes about the policy and expected outcomes of the policy. Self-perception effects lasted 
longer than more specific elaborations about the outcomes of the policy. 
 
We included an explicit plea condition in Study 1 and 4, to compare the effect of our 
labeling procedure with the practice of providing argument-based messages. In neither case 
these explicit messages resulted in an increase of pro-environmental decision-making. In the 
introduction we discussed several mechanisms, which might be responsible for the lack of a 
direct influence of such messages on behavior, like psychological reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 
1981; Reich & Robertson, 1979), fear control (Witte & Allen, 2000), communicating a 
descriptive norm meta-message (Cialdini, 2003), solving cognitive dissonance by altering 
values rather than behavior (Albarracín & McNatt, 2005), and the fact that making people 
think about public benefits will be likely to make them consider the private costs of the same 
behavior as well (Warlop et al., 2003, p. 205). We obviously do not dispute the value of 
educational campaigning. Lack of knowledge is an important predictor of non-compliance to 
social desirable behavior in many domains. We do suggest, however, that this approach needs 
to be complemented with an additional effort to render the promoted pro-social (e.g., pro-
environmental) values salient at the moment of decision making. Construal level theory (Trope 
& Liberman, 2000) states that at the moment of decision making, salient motives like self-
perception tend to have a strong impact on behavior. Persuasion tools like social labeling seem 
to be the appropriate complement to education based campaigns. They render pro-social 
values salient in the context of decision making. Additionally, they approach the consumer in a 
positive way, describing him or her in a social desirable fashion. People are more likely to  
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comply with a request when addressed positively. Negatively framed messages which 
emphasize problematic behavior tend to elicit feelings of guilt, reactance, or resentment 
(Reich and Robertson, 1979), which reduce the likelihood of compliance. 
 
Social labeling is related to techniques using descriptive social norms as a persuasion 
technique (Cialdini, 2003; Cialdini et al., 1990). However, rather than invoking social norms, 
social labeling suggests the existence of personal norms or values to engage in a certain pro-
social behavior. Our data showed that describing a target as having certain values increases 
the chance of them acting upon those values later on. Study 2 suggested that social labeling 
even results in consumers changing their interpretation of previous behavior in line with the 
value suggested by the label. Especially in situations where the social descriptive norm is not 
to engage in a certain social desirable behavior, a persuasion tool suggesting such personal 
norms could be a useful alternative. 
 
Future work should look into the effect of the relative desirability of the personality 
trait or values that the label communicates. People are motivated to elevate their self-
conceptions and to protect their self-concepts from negative information (Sedikides & Strube, 
1997). Therefore they may be more willing to act upon the communication of a desirable 
social label, compared to an undesirable one. Therefore, people for whom “being 
environmentally friendly” sounds positive should be persuaded more than those for whom it 
sounds negative. Other values a social marketing campaign may wish to activate through a 
labeling procedure (e.g., eating healthy, engaging in physical activity, buying products from 
the fair trade circuit) may be perceived as positive or negative by different segments of 
consumers. Perhaps people do accept labels which elevate their self-concept, also in the case 
that cognitive resources are abundant. On the other hand, it is possible that labels which are 
evaluated negatively are rejected, even under cognitive load conditions. It is important to 
extend our understanding of social labeling effects as it is an easily applicable tool to market 










Positive Cueing: Promoting Sustainable 
Consumer Behavior by Cueing Common 






In the present article we test a social marketing tool, to induce pro-environmental consumer 
behavior. The tool intends to do so by changing a target’s self-perception from someone who 
usually does not engage in pro-environmental behavior to someone who usually engages in 
pro-environmental behavior. It is based on the assumption that people may fail to view 
themselves as environmentally conscious because they consider the common ecological 
behaviors they display as non-diagnostic for the self-perception at hand (Study 1). Cueing 
commonly performed ecological behaviors (positive cueing) may render these behaviors more 
diagnostic (Study 2). As a result, people cued with commonly performed ecological behaviors 
view themselves more environmentally conscious than people who are not cued or who are 
cued with non-commonly performed ecological behaviors (Study 3). In addition, positive 
cueing leads to an increase in pro-environmental choices and behavior (Study 4). Implications 
for effective social marketing campaigns are discussed.  
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The call for social marketing research to address sustainable consumption issues has 
been put forward repeatedly since the early 70’s (Andreasen, 1995; Crane & Desmond, 2002; 
Kotler & Zaltman, 1971). In this paper we describe and test a social marketing tool for the 
promotion of environmental - and, by extension, sustainable - behavior. 
 
The promotion of sustainable consumption behavior has shown to be an arduous task.  
Despite an increased interest of the general public in sustainable development (European 
Commission, 2005; DEFRA, 2002), many individuals do not translate this increased interest in 
altered consumption decisions (Grunert, 1993; Pieters et al., 1998). An often cited reason for 
this phenomenon is that people associate sustainable behaviors with behavioral costs like 
money, time, effort, and inconvenience (Follows & Jobber, 2000; Pieters, 1989; Pieters et al., 
1998; Thøgersen, 1994a). This suggests that people’s attitudes towards specific ecological 
behaviors have an important impact on their decisions, over and above their attitudes towards 
the environment (Ajzen, 1996; McCarthy & Shrum, 1994; Thøgersen & Grunert-Beckmann, 
1997). The social marketing tool we present in this paper, positive cueing, aims at promoting 
pro-environmental behavior by improving those specific attitudes. 
 
The Role of the Perception of Previous Behavior in the Formation of Attitudes 
 
Changing people’s attitudes towards ecological behavior requires an understanding of 
how people construct such attitudes. In the current research we focus on self-perception as a 
route to persuasion. Self-perception theory (Bem, 1972) suggests that people derive their 
attitudes from their own previous behavior. People readily use their previous behavior as a 
heuristic basis for later decisions (Taylor, 1975).  If one engaged in a given behavior in the 
past, that person infers that he or she must like that behavior and the object toward the 
behavior was directed (Albarracín & Wyer, 2000). Relevant for the present research, people 
may derive their attitudes towards ecological behaviors from the perception of their past (lack 
of) pro-environmental conduct (Salancik & Conway, 1975).  
 
Two heuristics are likely to be applied when creating a perception of previous pro-
environmental behavior. First, the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) uses the 
experienced ease of retrieval (Schwarz et al., 1991) as a source of information. More 
specifically, the easier it is to come up with a few examples of own past environmental 
behavior, the more pro-environmental the derived self-perception will be. Second, the 
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) relies on a judgment of the 
similarity of a recalled event with an internalized representation or prototype for that event. 
This means that if a certain recalled behavior is judged to be more typical for the category of 
ecological behavior (e.g. going to work by bike versus putting off the lights in unused rooms), 
the more pro-environmental the inferred self-perception and attitude.  
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Based on the conceptual model of Raghubir and Menon (2005), we hypothesize that 
applying the representativeness heuristic in the context of environmental behaviors leads to 
underestimating the extent to which past behavior was pro-environmental. The main reason is 
that many commonly displayed environmental behaviors are somewhat ambiguous with 
respect to their ecological nature. Larger ambiguity renders a behavior less diagnostic to infer 
an attitude from. Raghubir and Menon (2005) identify several reasons why a certain behavior 
might be considered ambiguous as to how diagnostic it is to infer attitudes from, or how 
typical it is of a certain category (Sperling & Dosher, 1986). Two of those reasons particularly 
apply to the representativeness of ecological behaviors: frequency of occurrence and causal 
clarity. Frequency of occurrence refers to the consensus construct in Kelley’s attribution theory 
(1973). A behavior that has a higher frequency of occurrence in the population (e.g., avoiding 
to litter) may appear to be more normal and therefore less diagnostic with regard to a 
disposition like ecological concern. Causal clarity refers to the number of reasons a behavior 
can be attributed to (Morris & Larrick, 1995). Switching off lights in a room that is not used, 
for example, is an environmentally friendly behavior but it is more readily attributed to a 
concern to keep the electricity bill low. Causally unclear acts are more ambiguous because 
they can be attributed to more than one reason; therefore they will be dismissed as non-
diagnostic. For these two reasons, a large number of ecological behaviors may be judged non-
representative for the category of ecological acts and non-diagnostic to infer attitudes from. 
Because these behaviors are not perceived as diagnostic, they may be disregarded when 
people construct a self-perception of environmental consciousness on the basis of past pro-
environmental behavior. As a result, people will fail to infer a self-perception as someone who 
usually engages in pro-environmental behavior.  
 
Cueing Common Ecological Behaviors 
 
We hypothesize that cueing commonly performed ecological behaviors as environmental 
(i.e., positive cueing) increases the perception of engaging in pro-environmental behavior in 
the past. By emphasizing those environmental behaviors one previously performed, that 
person will infer he or she must have pro-environmental attitudes and will derive a self-
perception as someone who usually behaves ecological. Positive cueing may increase the 
extent to which previous behavior is perceived as pro-environmental through two routes. The 
first route involves accessibility: if one is cued with ‘cycling to work’ one retrieves instances of 
‘cycling to work’ more easily than if one is not cued. Importantly, this straightforward 
accessibility effect will only be effective if the retrieved behaviors are judged to be diagnostic 
for the inference of pro-environmental attitudes (e.g., when there are perceived as being pro-
environmental in nature).  
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A second route through which people may come to view themselves a environmentally 
conscious involves diagnosticity.: From a logic of conversation-perspective (Grice, 1975; 
Schwarz, 1994), cueing these behaviors as environmental may render them more relevant to 
derive attitudes from, than if they were not cued. It implies that the messenger, who 
communicates the cues (e.g., the government acting as a social marketer), does consider 
these behaviors as relevant to derive attitudes from. As a result, emphasizing the ecological 
nature of common environmental behaviors may motivate targets to reinterpret them as 
diagnostic to infer environmental attitudes from. This increased diagnosticity of behaviors one 
engages in will result in an increased self-perception as an environmentally friendly person. 
For an overview of our conjectures, see Figure 9.  
 
Using common environmental behaviors as cues has a two-fold advantage. First, by 
using behaviors in which most people engage, the technique can be used to address a large 
target audience with an identical message. The large majority of this audience will recognize 
that, indeed, they do engage in the mentioned behaviors. Second, since common behaviors in 
particular are spontaneously considered as non-diagnostic, they are affected most by a 
message which increases their diagnosticity by emphasizing the ecological nature of these 
behaviors. 
 
The Current Studies 
 
We tested our conjectures in four studies. In Study 1, we verified our assumption that a 
given environmental behavior tends to be regarded as less diagnostic for the actor’s green 
attitudes, when that behavior is performed by a larger number of people (i.e. when there is 
high consensus or high frequency of occurrence), or when the behavior can be attributed to 
alternative causes (high causal unclarity). In Study 2, we tested whether positive cueing leads 
to an increased perceived diagnosticity of these acts (arrow 1 in Figure 9). In Study 3, we 
tested the effect of the same manipulation on participants’ self-perception and attitudes 
(arrow 2 in Figure 9). In the final study, we put our proposed technique to the real test and 










We argue that people engage in several ecological behaviors that they do not 
spontaneously label as ecological. When using the representativeness heuristic, people tend to 
consider some behaviors non-diagnostic for making an inference about their green attitudes. 
We propose two reasons for the tendency to disregard some common ecological behaviors, 
when deriving someone’s position on the environmental consciousness trait. First, these 
behaviors may have a low causal clarity, because they might be attributed to other reasons 
than to the goal to behave environmentally. Second, they might be the type of behaviors most 
people engage in (high consensus or high frequency of occurrence), and therefore are not 
considered to be informative for inferring green attitudes. In this first study we want to verify 
our assumption that the perceived diagnosticity of any given environmental behavior for 
deriving one’s own or someone else’s green attitudes is smaller if a behavior has a high 




Participants and procedure 
 
 Thirty-two students participated in this study in exchange for partial course credit. 
Upon arrival in the lab, they were seated individually in front of a computer screen. Everyone 















Sixteen of these 40 behaviors were selected from a pretest (N = 42) in which we asked 
participants to list as many as possible environmental behaviors in which they usually engage. 
We selected the eight most often mentioned examples. These were ‘selectively disposing of 
household garbage’, ‘using the bike instead of the car when possible’, ‘avoid littering’, ‘turn off 
electrical appliances (to save energy)’, ‘using both sides of scratch paper’, ‘disposing cans and 
milk cartons in a separate garbage bag’, ‘leaving a clean spot after a picnic’ and ‘buying a less 
polluting product if there is a choice in the shop’. These eight behaviors constituted the high 
frequency set of behaviors. A low frequency set was constructed to contain eight 
environmental behaviors which people usually do not perform. These were selected from a 
second task in the same pretest, in which we asked to list as many as possible environmental 
behaviors in which participants usually do not engage. Most often mentioned behaviors were 
‘using saving lamps in my house’, ‘using public transportation instead of my own car’, ‘reduce 
shower time’, ‘buy glass instead of plastic bottles’, ‘being a member of environmental 
organizations’, ‘actively looking for the most environmentally friendly products’, ‘using a 
reusable shopping bag’ and ‘buying bio-products’. We added 24 other behaviors from the 




Participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Each group rated the 40 
behaviors on a different dimension. A first group rated the ‘degree to which [each behavior] is 
informative about someone’s environmental consciousness’ (Diagnosticity), with ‘not at all’ 
and ‘perfectly’ being the extremes of the scale. A second group rated ‘the percentage of 
people usually performing [each behavior]’ (Frequency of Occurrence), the scale ranging from 
0% to 100%. A third group rated ‘the degree to which people may have other than ecological 
reasons to perform [each behavior]’ (Causal Unclarity), on a scale ranging from ‘none at all’ to 
‘many’.  
 
The Cronbach alphas, representing inter-judge reliability scores, were .66, .88, and .86 
for the three groups, respectively (see Holbrook & Lehmann, 1980). For every group, we 
calculated the mean of the ratings given by the participants. This way we obtained a score for 
all forty behaviors on each of the three dimensions: Diagnosticity, Frequency of Occurrence 
and Causal Unclarity. By using separate sets of judges, we rule out alternative explanations 
for possible correlations based on shared method variance (MacKenzie et al., 1986). We then 
analyzed these data using the 40 behaviors as the rows in the data matrix (the units of 
observation), the three dimensions as columns, and the sample-average response of subjects 
as cell entries (subjects are considered as replicates, see Holbrook & Batra, 1987; Vanden  
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Consistent with our assumptions, the judgments of Causal Unclarity and Frequency of 
Occurrence correlate negatively with the Diagnosticity of the behaviors (r(40) = -.43, p < .01 
and r(40) = -.45, p < .01 respectively). Causal Unclarity and Frequency of Occurrence were 
not significantly correlated, r(40)= .03, p = .86. In addition, regressing Causal Unclarity and 
Frequency of Occurrence onto Diagnosticity showed that both Causal Unclarity and Frequency 
of Occurrence contributed independently to the prediction of Diagnosticity (t(37) = -3.20; p < 
.01 and t(37) = -3.41; p < .01, respectively, R² = .38).   
 
We conducted additional analyses on the ratings for the high and low frequency set of 
behaviors. As expected, an ANOVA showed that the high frequency set (M = 50.60, SD = 
11.64) was judged to contain more frequently performed behaviors (higher Frequency of 
Occurrence) than the low frequency set (M = 29.54, SD = 11.75, F(1, 14) = 12.91, p < .01). 
Not surprisingly, considering the reported correlations, the high frequency set (M = 60.89, SD 
= 3.64) was considered less diagnostic to infer environmental attitudes from, compared to the 
low frequency set (M = 70.79, SD = 9.04, F(1, 14) = 8.60, p < .01). Both sets did not differ 





This first study confirms our assumption that certain ecological behaviors are deemed 
less relevant to infer (some)one’s green attitudes from. An instance is judged to be less 
diagnostic when it is considered to be normative (i.e., when many people display that 
behavior) or when alternative reasons exist to attribute the behavior to. Because commonly 
performed behaviors tend to be considered non-diagnostic, people may disregard them when 




In this study we test whether cueing common environmental behaviors increases their 
diagnosticity, see arrow 1 in Figure 9. The results of Study 1 and the Frequency of Occurrence 
factor in the framework of Raghubir and Menon (2005) suggest that uncommon environmental 
behaviors are generally considered more diagnostic than common ones. Conversational logic, 
however, suggests that positive cueing may increase environmental behaviors’ diagnosticity to 
derive environmental attitudes from: Cueing these behaviors as environmental implies that  
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the entity, which communicates the cues, does consider the cued behaviors as relevant (i.e., 
diagnostic). As a result, emphasizing the ecological nature of common environmental 
behaviors by positive cueing may motivate targets to reinterpret them as diagnostic to infer 
environmental attitudes from. 
 
Possibly, this positive cueing effect is limited to the behaviors that initially are not 
considered very diagnostic. This implies that positive cueing would affect the diagnosticity of 
common environmental behaviors more than the diagnosticity of uncommon environmental 
behaviors. In addition, positive cueing may affect not only the diagnosticity of the cued 




Participants and design 
 
Eighty undergraduate students took part in exchange for partial course credit.  They 
came to the lab in groups of five to eight and were seated individually in front of a computer 
screen in semi-closed cubicles. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three 




We constructed three sets of behaviors. In the method section of Study 1, we clarified 
the content of the high frequency set, containing common behaviors, and the low frequency 
set, containing uncommon behaviors. We altered one of the items in the low Frequency set: 
‘Using public transportation instead of my own car’ became ‘I always use public transportation’ 
to further decrease the frequency and, hence, increase the diagnosticity of this item. A control 
set contained eight behaviors which were not related to ecology (e.g., ‘reading a newspaper 
every day’, ‘often eating French fries’). A pretest showed that the high and low frequent sets 
do not differ with respect to the average environmental friendliness of the behaviors (N = 19, 
t(18) =  -0.30, p = .77). Study 1 showed that both sets do not differ in causal unclarity. 
 
Our dependent measure consisted of 20 behaviors which were to be rated on their 
diagnosticity to infer someone’s environmental friendliness from. Those 20 items were of three 
types. First, the list included the eight uncommon environmental behaviors that were used as 
cues in the Low Frequency condition. Second, it included the eight common behaviors used as 
cues in the High Frequency condition. Third, we included four new common environmental 
behaviors, to find out whether the effect of the manipulation would generalize to common 





Participants in the High Frequency, the Low Frequency and the Control condition were 
presented the high frequency, the low Frequency or the control set of behaviors, respectively. 
We instructed them to indicate whether or not they usually display each of the eight 
environmental behaviors included in their list, on a seven point scale (ranging from I do not 
agree at all to I fully agree). In the control condition, we deleted the word ‘environmental’ 
from the instructions. 
 
 In the second phase of the experiment, after 10 minutes of unrelated filler tasks, 
participants completed the dependent measure. We asked them to indicate to which extent 
observing each of the 20 behaviors in others allows an inference of a person’s ‘environmental 






As intended, participants in the High Frequency condition indicated they engaged more 
in the behaviors included (M  = 6.12, SD = .50) than participants in the Low Frequency 




We averaged the diagnosticity-ratings for each of the three types of behaviors. 
Cronbach alpha’s for the common, uncommon, and new common behaviors were .84, .66 and 
.64, respectively. We then conducted a repeated measures ANOVA with cueing condition (High 
Frequency, Low Frequency, or Control) as a between subjects and type of behavior (common, 
uncommon, and new common) as within subjects factor. As predicted, the analysis revealed a 
significant interaction effect, F(4, 154) = 6.64, p < .01, see Figure 10.  
 
In the Control condition, uncommon behaviors (M = 77.62, SD = 9.50) were indeed 
judged as more diagnostic than common (M = 71.89, SD = 12,39, F(1, 77) = 12,74, p < .01) 
and new common behaviors (M = 68.51, SD = 14.07, F(1, 77) = 28.12, p < .01). New 
common behaviors were considered less diagnostic than the common behaviors (F(1, 77) = 
4.59, p < .04). The latter difference is small compared to that between the uncommon and 
both types of common behaviors and may be due to sampling effects.  
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In the Low Frequency condition, uncommon behaviors (M = 78.71) were judged to be 
more diagnostic than common (M = 71.25, F(1, 77) = 19.21, p < .01) and new common 
behaviors (M = 69.52, F(1, 77) = 25.41, p < .01). The difference between the common and 
the new common behaviors did not reach significance (F(1, 77) = 1.06, p = .31.  
 
In the High Frequency condition, we expected that positive cueing would increase the 
diagnosticity of common and possibly of new common behaviors. In line with this prediction 
we did not observe any differences in the High Frequency condition between the uncommon 
behaviors (M = 76.29) and common (M = 77.82, F(1, 77) <1) and new common ones (M = 
76.38,  F(1, 77) < 1). In fact, we observed an increase of the diagnosticity of common 
behaviors in the High Frequency group compared with the Low Frequency (F(1, 77) = 4.38, p 
< .04) and the Control condition (F(1, 77) = 3.80, p < .05). Additionally, we found that new 
common behaviors were judged as more diagnostic in the High Frequency condition, compared 
to the Low Frequency (F(1, 77) = 4.33, p < .04) and the Control condition (F(1, 77) = 6.07, p 
< .02). 
 
The diagnosticity of uncommon behaviors was not affected by the manipulation. We 
found no significant differences between the Control condition and the High and Low 
































Figure 10.  Mean diagnosticity ratings of different types of environmental behaviors in the High 






Common environmental behaviors are judged to be less diagnostic to derive 
environmental attitudes from than uncommon ones (Study 1). However, as Study 2 suggests, 
cueing these behaviors as environmental increases their diagnosticity. Importantly, this 
positive cueing effect generalizes to new common behaviors: we also observed an increased 
diagnosticity of common behaviors, which were not used as cues themselves, as the result of 
cueing with other common behaviors. Note that uncommon environmental behaviors, which 
are considered diagnostic before cueing, did not increase in diagnosticity after cueing with 
either common or uncommon behaviors. This indicates that cueing people with common 
environmental behaviors may affect their environmental self-perception more than cueing with 




In the current study, we examined participants’ attitudes toward environmental 
behavior, their moral obligation to protect the environment, and their self-perceived 
environmental consciousness following no cueing (control condition), cueing with common 
environmental behaviors (High Frequency condition) or cueing with uncommon environmental 
behaviors (Low Frequency condition). Considering that, by definition, people engage in 
common environmental behaviors, we expect that an increased diagnosticity of these 
behaviors should result in more environmentally friendly attitudes and self-perceptions and an 
increased moral obligation to protect the environment. Therefore, we expect more 
environmentally friendly attitudes, moral obligations and self-perceptions in the High 
frequency condition than in either the Low frequency or the Control condition. We did not 
expect any differences between the Low frequency and the Control condition. 
Although we did not expect any differences between the Control condition and the Low 
frequency condition, we decided to retain the Low Frequent condition for two reasons. First, as 
a second control condition it excludes alternative explanations in terms of priming 
environmental behavior, since the environmental friendliness of the high and low frequency 
set was identical. Second, it is a way of simulating the traditional social marketing approach. 
Social marketing campaigns often emphasize these uncommon behaviors, in which people 
should but do not engage. Those campaigns might, temporarily, motivate targets to make 
pro-environmental decisions. However, we predict that such an approach is not likely to 







Participants and procedure 
 
One hundred and sixty undergraduate students took part in exchange for partial course 
credit.  They came to the lab in groups of five to eight and were seated individually in front of 
a computer screen in semi-closed cubicles. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions: the High Frequency, the Low Frequency, or the Control condition. These 
groups were presented with the high frequency, low frequency, and control set of behaviors, 
respectively. We instructed them to indicate whether or not they usually display each of the 
eight (environmental) behaviors included in their list, on a seven point scale (ranging from I 
do not agree at all to I fully agree). In the second phase of the experiment, after 20 minutes 
of filler tasks, we administered a questionnaire which measured environmental attitude, self-




We used the same positive cueing manipulation of Study 2. The dependent measure was 
a 3-item scale which probed participants’ attitudes towards ecological behaviors. The attitude 
items were embedded in a longer questionnaire, to conceal the true purpose of the task. 
Additionally, we measured participant’s self-perception as an ecological consumer (2 items). 
One additional item measured the degree to which participants feel morally obliged to protect 






As intended, participants in the High Frequency condition indicated they engaged more 
in the behaviors included (M  = 5.53, SD = .79) than participants in the Low Frequency 
condition (M = 3.05, SD = .97, F(1, 103) = 204.88, p < .01).  
 
Attitudes towards ecological behaviors 
 
The three attitude-items loaded on one factor which explained 75.69 % of the variance 
(α  = .84). The ANOVA on the mean of these items revealed that the cueing manipulation 
significantly affected participant’s attitudes towards ecological behaviors, F(2, 157) = 7.47, p 
< .01.  Simple contrasts revealed that the attitudes in the High Frequency condition (M = 
5.21, SD = .92) were more favorable than in the Control group (M = 4.59, SD = .87; F(1,  
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157) = 14.41, p < .01), and than in the Low Frequency group (M = 4.79, SD = .82; F(1, 157) 
= 6.52,  p < .01). The latter two conditions did not differ significantly (F(1, 157) = 1.50, p = 
.22).   
 
Self-perception and moral obligation 
 
The two items probing self perception as a ‘green consumer’ loaded on one factor which 
explained 77.51% of the variance and they constituted a reliable scale (α = .71).  The ANOVA 
on the mean scores showed that our manipulation influenced the self-perception of 
participants, F(2, 157)= 9.97,  p < .01.  Simple contrasts revealed that participants in the 
High Frequency condition perceived themselves as more ecological (M = 4.51, SD = .92) than 
participants in the Control group (M = 3.88, SD = 1.10; F(1, 157) = 9.80, p < .01) and in the 
Low Frequency group (M = 3.63, SD = 1.07; F(1, 157) = 18.80, p < .01). Participants in the 
Low Frequency condition did not perceive themselves significantly different from those of the 
Control group (F(1, 157) = 1.57, p = .21).  
 
 
Table 1.  Means and Standard Deviations of the Items of the Attitude, Self-perception and Moral 
obligation Scale in Study 3 
 
 
The ANOVA on the item measuring participants’ feeling of moral obligation to protect the 
environment, also revealed a significant effect of our manipulation (F(2, 157) = 4.20, p < 
.02). The High Frequency group scored marginally higher (M = 5.29, SD = .16) than the 
Control group (M = 4.89, SD = .15, F(1, 157) = 3.35, p < .07) and higher than the Low 
Frequency group (M = 4.66, SD = .15, F(1, 157) = 8.21, p < .01). Again, the Low Frequency 
group did not significantly differ from the Control group (F(1, 157) = 1.14, p = .29). 
  
High 
Frequency   Low  Frequency    Control 
    Mean  SD   Mean  SD   Mean  SD 
 
How do you feel about environmental behaviors? 













How do you feel about performing environmental 














How important is it that you perform environmental 
behaviors? 
(1= not important at all, 7 = very important) 
 
I think I behave environmental. 
(1 = totally don’t agree, 7= totally agree) 
 
When I buy a product, I take ecological considerations into 
account. 
(1 = totally don’t agree, 7= totally agree) 
 
I feel morally obliged to protect the environment 
























































































A Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986) indicated that the attitude towards environmental 
behaviors mediated the effect of our manipulation on participant’s self-perception (Z = -3.06, 
p < .01) and moral obligation (Z = -3.32, p < .01). In both cases the bootstrapped estimate 
of the indirect effect was significant with 99% confidence (Preacher & Hayes, 2004)
4. The 
effect of the manipulation on the mediator, environmental attitude, was significant, as shown 
above. The direct effects of environmental attitude on self-perception (t(159) = -3.71, p < 
.01) and on moral obligation (t(159) = 7.27, p < .01) were significant. The direct effects of 
the manipulation on self-perception (t(159) = -1.61, p = .11) and on moral obligation (t(159) 




The current study demonstrates that positive cueing renders people’s attitudes towards 
ecological behaviors more favorable, makes them perceive themselves as more 
environmentally friendly and increases their sense of moral obligation to act environmentally 
friendly. The effects of positive cueing on self-perception and on moral obligation are mediated 
by the positive cueing effect on the attitudes towards ecological behaviors.  
 
In the current study, we did not observe any significant differences between the control 
condition and the Low frequency condition. This was to be expected, as Study 2 showed that 
cueing Low Frequent behaviors did not influence the diagnosticity of common or uncommon 
environmental behaviors. One might expect that an approach which emphasizes previous 
failures to behave environmentally friendly (the Low Frequency condition) might induce 
hypocrisy (Aronson et al., 1991). Induced hypocrisy might be effective at improving 
environmental attitudes. In our experiment, we did not observe any beneficial induced 
h y p o c r i s y  e f f e c t s .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  w e  d i d  n o t  i n c l u d e  a  p h a s e  i n  o u r  
experiment which elicits a (public) commitment to one’s attitudes, as is usually done in 
induced hypocrisy studies. Without that step, emphasizing people’s flaws seems not to be an 
efficient method to improve attitudes. On the other hand, we also did not observe backfire 
effects in the Low Frequency condition. So, making it salient to people that they usually do not 
engage in environmental behaviors, as is done in the Low frequency condition, did not 
adversely affect their attitudes towards ecological behaviors, self-perceptions and their sense 
of moral obligation to act environmentally friendly. 
 
 
                                                 
4 A reversed model shows that self-perception partially mediates the relation between our manipulation 
and attitude. The indirect effect is significant (Z = -2.59, p < .01) but the effect of the manipulation on 
attitude remains significant after controlling for self-perception (t = -2.67, p < .01). As the model in which 




Assuming that a more favorable attitude towards ecological behavior should result in 
more environmentally friendly behavior (Ajzen, 1996; Gill et al., 1986; Minton & Rose, 1997), 
we tested the potential of cueing common environmental behaviors for beneficially influencing 
actual ecological behavior.  
 
To examine the effect of cueing on actual behavior, participants were presented with a 
product choice task in a simulated shop and another, consequential product choice.  In both 
instances, one choice alternative was a more ecologically sound, but more expensive 
alternative of the other. In addition, we observed how efficiently participants used available 
scratch paper in a task where they were asked to make notes.  
 
Several steps were taken to avoid demand effects or hypothesis guessing (cf. Sawyer, 
1975). First, we did not measure people’s attitudes towards ecological behavior. Second, we 
included unrelated filler tasks. Third, the note task rendered a very subtle measure, unlikely to 
be sensitive to demand effects, as the environmental aspect of the task was not evident. 
Fourth, we made the product choices as consequential as possible. The notepad choice was an 
actual choice between an ecological and a more attractive non-ecological notepad. In the 
s i m u l a t e d  s h o p  t a s k ,  p a r t i c i p a n t s  w e r e  t o l d  t h a t  t h e y  w o u l d  h a v e  t o  b u y  o n e  r a n d o m l y  
determined product chosen by them.  
 
Considering the results of Study 2 and 3, we expected a higher number of pro-
environmental choices in the High Frequency condition compared to the Low Frequency and 
Control condition. As we did not observe any differences between the latter two conditions in 





Participants and procedure 
 
 Sixty-six undergraduates were paid 6 € for participation in this study. They came to the 
lab in groups of five to eight. At the beginning of the session, before introducing our 
manipulation, we asked them to complete an environmental concern questionnaire. We used 
13 of the 16 items of the environmental concern scale of Minton and Rose (1997), dropping 
three repetitive items, to keep the questionnaire as short as possible. Then participants were 
subjected to a cueing manipulation, which was identical with the one in the previous studies 





The remaining part of the session consisted of several tasks, measuring ecological behavior. 
After completing a filler task, participants were presented with a product choice task. They 
received ten product pairs: five filler pairs and five critical pairs. In each critical pair, one 
product was a more environmentally friendly but more expensive alternative of the other. We 
asked the participants to indicate which product they would pick if they were to purchase them 
now. To increase ecological validity, we informed participants that at the end of the session, 
they actually had to purchase the product of their choice from a randomly chosen product 
category. They would have to use part of their participation fee to do so. 
 
 The critical product categories were cookies (differing in the amount of plastic used for 
wrapping), kitchen paper, deodorants, (energy-efficient) lamps, and detergents, see Appendix.  
For eight product categories, the more expensive product cost 1.05 € whereas the less 
expensive product cost 0.95 €. For the lamps, the prices were 1.50 € and 1.30 €, respectively, 
and for detergents, they were 1.40 € and 1.30 €, respectively. These prices were pre-tested in 
a different sample of the same student population (N = 34) by informing participants about 
the shop value of a certain object and asking them which (higher) price they would be willing 
to pay for a more ecological variant of that product. We used the median price mentioned for 
the ecological products in the choice task.  
 
After the choice task, we measured unobtrusively how efficiently respondents used 
scratch paper.  W e  a s k e d  p a r t i c i p a n t s  t o  w r i t e  d o w n  a  s h o r t  s u m m a r y  o f  e a c h  o f  e l e v e n  
elaborated product claims shown on the screen, under the pretext of investigating which 
pieces of information are judged as essential by consumers. We actually examined how 
economically participants used the available paper, counting the number of sheets used and 
measuring the percentage of the surface actually used to write on.  
 
The final measure was an actual product choice (notepad choice). After working 10 
more minutes on filler tasks, participants learned that the experimental session was finished; 
they were asked to proceed to the exit of the lab, where the experimenter would pay them for 
their cooperation. The experimenter thanked them individually for their participation and paid 
the promised 6 €, casually mentioning the fact that, since summer holidays were coming up, 
some leftover material from previous experiments was to be given away.  They could take a 
notepad from a nearby table. The notepads were piled up in two stacks. One stack contained 
notepads made from brownish, recycled paper; these notepads had a large “recycled” logo on 
the cover. The other stack contained notepads made from white, regular paper. The shop 
value of these notepads is 1.39 € and 1.30 €, respectively.  The experimenter inconspicuously  
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Like in our previous studies, we compared the indicated frequencies with which the two 
experimental groups perform their set of activities as a manipulation check (we failed to 
record this frequency for 4 participants, because of a computer malfunction).  Participants in 
the High Frequency condition indicated they engaged more in the behaviors included (M = 
5.96, SD = .77) than participants in the Low Frequency condition (M = 3.34, SD = .87, F(1, 
39) = 104.61; p < .01). 
 
Product choice task 
 
We performed an ANCOVA on the number of ecological choices made in the product 
choice task, using environmental concern as a covariate. The scree plot resulting from the 
factor analysis on these 13 environmental concern items suggested a uni-dimensional 
solution.  One factor explained 48.47% of the total variance (Cronbach’s α = .90).  
 
The analysis revealed a significant effect of the manipulation on the number of 
ecological products chosen (F(2, 62) = 8.22; p < .01). Simple contrasts show that, on 
average, the High Frequency group chose more ecological products (M = 3.12, SD = .79) than 
the Control group (M = 2.34, SD = 1.14, F(1, 62) = 7.07; p < .01) and than the Low 
Frequency group (M = 1.96, SD = 1.13, F(1, 62) = 15.89; p < .01). The Low Frequency and 
the Control group did not significantly differ (F(1, 62) = 1.69; p = .20). The covariate, 
ecological concern, had a significant, positive relation with number of ecological products 
chosen (F(1, 62) = 7.28; p < .01), indicating that our dependent measure is indeed sensitive 
to the willingness to make the environmentally friendly choices.   
  
Notepad choice task 
 
Participants assumed the experiment was over when they were offered to take a 
notepad home.  Two participants turned down the offer so we ended up with 64 observations. 
A chi-square test revealed a significant effect of cueing (χ²(2, N = 64) = 14.59; p < .01).  The 
ecological notepad was chosen more often in the High Frequency condition (81%) than in the 
Control group (52%), χ²(1, n = 42) = 3.86, p < .05, and than in the Low Frequency condition 
(23%), χ²(1, n = 43) = 14.58, p < .01.  Moreover, choosing the ecological notepad was also 
significantly more likely in the Control condition than in the Low Frequency condition, χ²(1, n 
= 43) = 4.04, p < .04.  
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Use of scratch paper 
 
Participants were free to use as many sheets of paper as needed to summarize eleven 
elaborated product claims presented on the computer screen.  The sheets were 9.7 cm by 10 
cm. As a measure of paper usage efficiency, we used scanner software to determine which 
percentage of the total surface of used sheets was actually written on. We squared this 
number to approximate a normal distribution. Higher numbers correspond with more efficient, 
and therefore more ecological, paper usage
5. The ANCOVA, controlling for the number of 
words participants wrote, and for environmental concern, revealed a significant effect of 
cueing, F(2, 59) = 3.74, p < .03.  The High Frequency group (M = .30, SD = .26) used the 
paper more efficiently than the Control group (M = .13, SD = .10; F(1,59) = 7.28, p < .01). 
The difference between the High- and the Low Frequency group (M = .20, SD = .22) was 
marginally significant, F(1, 59) = 2.96, p < .09, but we did not find a significant difference 
between the Low Frequency group  and the Control group (F(1, 59) = 1.13; p = .29).  
 
Additionally, we measured the size of participants’ handwriting.  In order to do so we 
chose three words that met two criteria. First, they should have been written down by 
(almost) all participants - because participants wrote down summaries, not everybody used 
the same words - and second, they should appear more or less in the middle or at the end of 
the sequence of claims, since the size of the handwriting was often very variable within each 
participant for the first claims. We found two words that were written down by everyone and 
one word that was written down by all but one participant. The selected words were 
‘glycerine’, ‘omega3’ and ‘celoxydatie’ (Dutch for ‘cell oxidation’). We measured the length of 
these words in centimeters for each participant. To control for objective word length, we 
standardized these scores and then calculated the average length of these three standardized 
scores. We found a significant effect (F(2, 59) = 3.36, p < .04) showing that participants in 
the High Frequency condition wrote smaller (M = -.40, SD = .66) than participants in the 
Control group (M = .16, SD = .93; F(1, 59) = 5.63, p < .02) and the Low Frequency group (M 
= .10, SD = .59; F(1, 59) = 4.47, p < .04). There was no significant difference between the 




Positive cueing successfully increased the level of participant’s environmental behavior. 
Participants in the High Frequency condition indicated a larger preference for buying a more 
expensive, but environmentally friendly variant of a common product in the simulated shop 
                                                 
5  The data of  three participants were excluded from this analysis, for not following the instructions. They 
indicated whether they thought the statement was true or false, rather than writing down a summary.  
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environment, and more often chose the less attractive but recycled notepad, which they could 
take home with them.  
 
Since the environmental dimension of the choice tasks was very obvious – making a 
choice between a product and its environmental alternative – we also included a task for which 
the environmental dimension was not obvious at all: making notes on scratch paper. Even for 
that task, we found that cueing common environmental behaviors resulted in more efficient 
and therefore more environmentally friendly use of scratch paper compared to no cueing or 
cueing uncommon environmental behaviors. Participants even went as far as ‘spontaneously’ 
decreasing the size of their handwriting to make more efficient use of the provided paper. This 
suggests that the manipulation not merely primes the concept of ecology, which would 
influence subsequent choices with a clearly ecology-related dimension. Instead, those who are 
cued with commonly performed environmental behaviors seemed to look actively for ways in 
which they could adjust their behavior in order to minimize their environmental impact. Again, 
emphasizing the green behaviors that people generally do not engage in, a technique used by 
traditional social marketing campaigns (cf. the induced hypocrisy effect), did not result in 
more environmental choices. To the contrary, in the notepad choice task it actually led to less 
environmental choices than in the Control condition. This is a result in line with the findings of 
Menon, Block, and Ramanathan (2002). They found that cueing uncommon behaviors that 
may lead to contracting hepatitis C led people to worry less about contracting this disease 
than a Control group. It could be that in our other measures, we observed a floor effect, 
because of which scores in the Low Frequency condition were not significantly lower than in 
the Control condition. We must be careful, however, when interpreting this result. Of a total of 
six measures, the notepad choice task was the only one in which we observed a difference 
between the Low Frequency and the Control condition. Therefore this result can not be 
considered to be as reliable as the beneficial effect of cueing common environmental 
behaviors, which was replicated six out of six times. Additionally, in the Menon et al. (2002) 
studies, results regarding a backfire effect of cueing uncommon behaviors were mixed as well. 
For example, they did not find a difference between the control and the uncommon behaviors 
condition on the estimated risk of contracting hepatitis C. Further research on this possible 
backfire effect is warranted. 
 
We included some features to the design of this study to reduce the likelihood of a 
demand effect driving our results. For example, we added an environmental consciousness 
measure, which was administered right before our cueing manipulation. Doing so, we rule out 
an alternative explanation regarding environmental priming: all participants were primed with 
references to environmental behaviors. In fact, the High and Low Frequency condition did not 
differ at all regarding environmental references. Also, following guidelines of Sawyer (1975), 
we included multiple dependent measures in our study. Since both choice tasks were to some  
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extent consequential and the note task hardly could be recognized as an environmental task 
and came with a distracting cover story (writing down summaries of product statements), it is 




The current paper presents and tests a social marketing tool, positive cueing, which 
applies the idea that in some situations, attitudes are derived from prior behavior (Bem, 1972) 
or rather, the perception of that behavior (Salancik & Conway, 1975). This perception is based 
on the use of the accessibility and the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). By emphasizing previous pro-environmental behavior, 
positive cueing results in increased pro-environmental decision making. We propose that this 
tool is equally applicable in other areas, like the promotion of healthy eating, physical exercise 
or driving safely.  
 
Study 1 supports the assumption that not all ecological behaviors are considered 
equally diagnostic to infer attitudes from. It suggests that people may refrain from drawing 
inferences from behaviors that are easily explainable by other factors including its mere 
commonness (Raghubir & Menon, 2005). Study 2 showed that cueing such behaviors as 
environmental renders them more diagnostic and relevant than when they are not cued. The 
results of Study 3 show that positive cueing renders people’s attitudes towards 
environmentally friendly behaviors more favorable. It favors perceiving one-self as an 
environmental person and increases the feeling of moral obligation to do an effort for the 
environment. In addition, Study 4 demonstrated that it is effective in promoting pro-
environmental decision making. 
  
These results allow us to propose some guidelines for designing effective social 
marketing campaigns, in all areas of sustainable behavior (and beyond). Traditional social 
marketing campaigns often emphasize how poorly the target audience is doing with regard to 
a certain topic. These types of campaigns sometimes induce aversive feelings towards the 
request, and elicit feelings of guilt, reactance and resentment (Reich & Robertson, 1979), as 
people do not like being told what to do. Implicitly, traditional campaigns also tell the audience 
that they are just doing what every next person does (i.e. failing to make environmental 
choices), which has been shown to reinforce their (undesirable) behavior (Cialdini, 2003). 
Saying that “a problematic behavior needs urgent attention because it is very prevalent” 
implies that it is prevalent. Research on descriptive norms (Cialdini et al., 1990) suggests that 
simply  doing what everyone else is doing is often preferred over doing the right thing. 
Therefore such a message, ironically, might be interpreted as a justification to keep on 
engaging in the undesirable behavior. Our findings confirm that this may result in an  
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ineffective social marketing effort. The Low Frequency condition simulated the type of 
campaign communication which emphasizes how little a target person is (and implicitly, how 
little most people are) doing for the environment. For all but one of our measures, the Low 
Frequency group did not differ from the Control group. And in the single case it did differ, it 
resulted in less environmentally-friendly behavior. We therefore propose an alternative 
approach, which emphasizes that people have, in fact, already adopted several changes for 
the better. Our data suggest that drawing attention to the ecological behavior people already 
engage in, improves their attitudes towards ecological behaviors. This makes them more 
sensitive to persuasive requests proposing to adopt additional pro-environmental behaviors. 
This idea is reminiscent to the use of descriptive social norms as a persuasion technique 
(Cialdini, 2003; Cialdini et al., 1990). However, rather than invoking social norms, the social 
marketing tool we presented in this paper draws on suggesting the existence of personal 
norms or values to engage in pro-environmental behavior. Our data showed that suggesting 
that one has engaged in a certain behavior in the past will make it more likely that the target 
person repeats that type of behavior later on. Especially in situations where the social 
descriptive norm is not to engage in a certain social desirable behavior, our alternative might 
be a useful addition to the arsenal of the social marketer. 
 
Second, traditional campaigns usually call upon people’s sense of morality when asking 
them to do the ‘right thing’. Because of the behavioral costs related to sustainable behaviors 
(Follows & Jobber, 2000; Pieters, 1989; Pieters et al., 1998; Thøgersen, 1994a), these 
requests are only effective in the short term, until the costs regain salience. The technique we 
presented in this paper influences consumers’ self-perception. People are led to see 
themselves as “someone who is willing to do an effort for the environment”, or any other 
promoted cause, and act upon that self-perception (Osbaldiston & Sheldon, 2003). Someone 
who perceives himself as an environmentally friendly consumer is internally motivated to act 
upon this perception. It is a well-documented fact that internal motivation results in increased 
performance and persistence of a behavior (Ryan & Deci, 2000; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). 
Therefore we expect a persuasion method based on a self-perception change to have a longer 
term effect (Albarracín & Wyer, 2001). 
 
The technique we presented in this paper is related to a class of persuasion methods, 
which use consistency and self-perception as drivers for the effect. Compared to foot-in-the-
door related strategies (Cialdini, 2001; Freedman & Fraser, 1966),  the self-prophecy 
phenomenon (Spangenberg & Greenwald, 1999), the labeling technique (Burger & Caldwell, 
2003; Kraut, 1973; R. L. Miller et al., 1975), and induced hypocrisy (Aronson et al., 1991), 
the advantage of the cueing technique is that it involves a less intrusive procedure. Unlike the 
mentioned strategies, the cueing technique does not require a first request (foot-in-the-door), 
an enquiry into future intentions (self-prophecy), the provocation of a certain behavior  
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(labeling) or a communication emphasizing people’s personal norms and reminding them of 
past failure to comply with these norms (induced hypocrisy). It merely consists of cueing 
instances of past engaging in the target behavior. Therefore the technique may be more 





In this dissertation, we attempted to make a case for a complementary persuasion 
approach for the social marketing practice. This field faces the challenging task of convincing 
individuals to forgo their immediate self-interest and pursue the wellbeing of others, whether 
it be their close acquaintances or society at large. Previous research suggests that there is a 
need to rethink the traditional style of social marketing actions, as they have shown to very 
successful at changing attitudes, values and behavioral intentions, but were largely 
unsuccessful at producing long-term behavior change (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). We propose to 
abandon the traditional assumption that it is always necessary to make people think about the 
consequences of behavioral alternatives (Andreasen, 1995) in order to motivate them to 
behave pro-socially. Encouraging people to think, using campaigns based on education and 
the communication of arguments, may fail to produce behavior change. We have documented 
on several psychological phenomena, which may account for this observation. Fairly recent 
insights in social psychology and consumer behavior suggest that people are not the rational 
and reasoned decision makers there are assumed to be by the traditional social marketing 
approach. In fact, many choices in daily life are executed as part of a continuous stream of 
behaviors which are executed fairly automatically, based on heuristics and minimal 
informational input (Alba et al., 1991; Warlop et al., 2003). This view on decision making 
suggests that in some cases more subtle techniques, which influence automatic judgments 
and decision making, could be more successful at achieving the desired behavior change 
(Albarracín & Wyer, 2001). We tested these ideas in the context of environmentally friendly 
behavior, but we are confident that our findings can be generalized to other fields of socially 
desirable behavior, like healthy behavior, driving safely, and helping behavior. 
 
Several researchers have identified the choice to behave pro-environmentally as a 
social dilemma (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; van Vugt et al., 1996; Wiener & Doescher, 1991). 
Choosing to conserve the environment is considered to be a cooperative behavior because it 
serves the interest of society in the long term. On the other hand, behavioral costs associated 
with this type of actions, like money, time, effort, and inconvenience tempt individuals to 
make selfish choices (Follows & Jobber, 2000; Pieters, 1989; Pieters et al., 1998; Thøgersen, 
1994a). In this dissertation, we followed this tradition of using the social dilemma as a model 
for the conflict that an individual experiences between a social desirable behavioral alternative, 
which benefits the group, and an egoistic alternative, which benefits the self. 
  





Decision making in social dilemmas 
 
In a first manuscript, we confirmed the hypothesis that decision making in a social 
dilemma is the result of a two-step process. In a first phase, decisions are based on an 
automatic and intuitive system. Some people have an intuitive preference for cooperation, 
whereas others intuitively choose to defect (i.e., to pursue one’s immediate self-interest). We 
identified SVO as a concept that grasps these different automatic tendencies. Subsequently, if 
people are sufficiently motivated, and have the cognitive resources to do so, people analyze 
the decision situation more systematically. The result of such an elaborated reasoning process 
is a general tendency to pursue the immediate self-interest. These findings suggest that self-
interest is a very salient category, which weighs heavily on a deliberate thinking process.  
 
Additionally, we showed that intuitive decisions can be influenced. We identified 
perceived interpersonal closeness as a process involved in automatic decisions in an 
interdependence situation. Increasing (decreasing) perceived interpersonal closeness leads to 
more (less) cooperative choices when decisions are made intuitively, whereas perceived 
closeness does not have any effect on behavior if choices are preceded by a more elaborate 
thinking process.  
 
These findings have some implications for the complementary persuasion approach for 
social marketing actions we are looking for. First, they provide a rationale for the observation 
that encouraging people to think about the consequences of behavioral alternative, is usually 
not successful at achieving long-term behavior change. Encouraging one to think about the 
benefits of a certain behavior, is likely to make them think about the costs of this behavior as 
well (Warlop et al., 2003). As private costs and benefits are more salient than public costs and 
benefits (Rothschild, 1979), such a deliberation process is likely to result in the individual 
choosing the selfish option (i.e., the non-socially desirable behavior). A first criterion the 
complementary persuasion approach should meet then, is that it should prevent people from 
thinking too much about their decisions. Second, we showed that if we can activate a certain 
value at the moment of decision making, it is likely to influence judgments. This implies that a 
second criterion the complementary persuasion approach should comply with, is that it should 
activate those values and self-perceptions which are likely to induce the desired behavior. We 
have argued before that the traditional social marketing approach, based on education and 
providing arguments, has been very successful at fostering pro-environmental attitudes, 
values, and behavioral intentions. We propose that in order to translate these into pro-
environmental behaviors, they should be activated at the moment of decision making. 
 
In manuscript II and III, we presented and tested two tools which meet both criteria: 
social labeling and positive cueing. Both tools build on the idea that activating a target  
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person’s self-perception as “the kind of person who usually behaves pro-environmentally” 
provokes behavior that is consistent with this (changed) self-perception. 
 
Whatever people say I am, that’s what I am 
 
Previous research has shown that people’s (perception of their) previous behavior 
guides future decision making (Albarracín & Wyer, 2000; Taylor, 1975). Also, people seem to 
rely partly on external information, given by third parties, to develop a perception of their own 
personality (Bem, 1972; Strenta & DeJong, 1981). The social labeling technique builds on both 
ideas and consists of providing a target person with a statement about his or her personality 
or values (i.e., the social label). A heuristic decision process that relies on such an activated 
self-perception should provoke behavior that is consistent with the social label. In Manuscript 
II we proposed and tested a new procedure, which enables using the social labeling technique. 
In a first step of the procedure, an external motivation (e.g., a price promotion) provokes a 
target person to make an environmentally friendly (purchase) decision. In a second step the 
social label, which describes the target as an environmentally friendly person, is 
communicated. The social label suggests an alternative attribution of the provoked choice. It 
invites the target to attribute the pro-environmental choice he or she just made, to his or her 
pro-environmental values rather than to economic rationality (which was the actual motivation 
for the purchase). When this re-attribution is successful, the changed self-perception is likely 
to produce more environmentally friendly behavior subsequently.  
 
Our findings indicated that describing participants as “very concerned with the 
environment, and ecologically conscious”, following an incidental pro-environmental decision, 
indeed produced an increase in environmentally friendly purchase decisions. Interestingly, this 
was only the case when participants were distracted while processing the information given by 
the labeling communication. We attributed this finding to the fact that the mis-attribution 
triggered by the label might activate persuasion knowledge (Friestad & Wright, 1994). 
Because in real life, most consumer choice situations are characterized by the presence of 
distracting cues, we can conclude that in common, cognitively demanding situations the social 
labeling procedure will work.  
 
Even when the label was processed with full attention, however, it showed to have an 
effect on behavior after a delay. This ‘sleeper effect’ supports our hypothesis that the labeling 
communication might activate persuasion knowledge. After some time has passed, however, 
the context in which the label was communicated and the fact that its content was rejected 




Cueing Common Environmental Behaviors as Environmental 
 
In a third manuscript, we presented and test the positive cueing technique. Analogous 
to social labeling, it attempts to promote pro-environmental decision making by activating 
individual’s self-perceptions as being a person who is concerned with environmental issues. 
People tend to use (perceptions of) previous behavior as a heuristic in current decision 
making. Previous research suggests, however, that individuals underestimate the level of their 
previous pro-environmental conduct (Raghubir & Menon, 2005). The main reason is that many 
commonly displayed environmental behaviors are somewhat ambiguous with respect to their 
ecological nature. Common behaviors, like switching off light in unused rooms, for example, 
tend to be attributed to a concern to reduce one’s electricity bill or to mere habit rather than 
to one’s personal ecological concerns. Therefore these behaviors are not considered diagnostic 
about one’s environmental concern. 
 
Four studies showed that cueing such commonly performed environmental behaviors 
as environmental results in increased pro-environmental decision making. We also revealed 
the process responsible for this effect. Positive cueing increases the perceived diagnosticity of 
common environmental behaviors with respect to one’s environmental attitudes. 
Subsequently, the manipulation renders people’s attitudes towards ecological behaviors more 
favorable and makes them perceive themselves more as concerned with the environment. 
Using this self-perception that one is “the kind of person that usually makes pro-
environmental decisions” as a decision heuristic showed to account for the success of the 
positive cueing manipulation.  
 
In contrast with social labeling, positive cueing was successful, even when the cues 
were processed with full attention. We assume this is the case because positive cueing is leads 
the target person in a smoother way towards the idea that he or she must be very concerned 
with the environment, compared to social labeling. A social label suggests a person to re-
attribute his or her behavior, which may elicit resistance to accept the content of the label if 
one is fully aware of the actual reason for engaging in that particular behavior. Positive cueing 
encourages the target to draw his or her own conclusions, by simply offering examples of 
engaging in pro-environmental behavior in the past. The individual is less likely to try to resist 
drawing the suggested conclusion, because the suggestion is presented in a more subtle way. 
Social labeling, on the other hand, offers the advantage of having much control over which 
attribution the target finally makes. Cueing certain behaviors might result in a target person 




The complementary persuasion approach in relation with traditional social 
marketing methods 
 
As the word “complementary” indicates, we do not suggest that our more subtle 
manipulations are meant to entirely replace traditional social marketing methods. The 
traditional social marketing approach assumes that people base their decision on an 
elaborated reasoning process. The resulting preference for argument-based and educational 
campaigning styles, has been successful at fostering pro-environmental attitudes, values, and 
behavioral intentions. This will always be an essential first step towards long-term behavior 
change: people should be concerned about the problem at hand and they should also be 
informed about what should be done to solve the problem. At the same time, this kind of 
approach has been largely unsuccessful at changing actual behavior (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). 
This suggests the need for a complementary approach, which can help people to translate the 
concern, attitudes, and intentions, fostered by argument-based communications, into actual 
behavior change. 
 
We have argued that, contrary to these traditional assumptions, much of our behavior 
is actually the result of heuristic processing, based on minimal informational input. Therefore 
these pro-environmental attitudes, values, and behavioral intentions will only drive behavior if 
they have been sufficiently internalized and if they are sufficiently salient (i.e., more salient 
than immediate self-interested motives) at the moment of decision making. We suggest that 
tools which activate this pro-environmental cognitive content at the moment of decision 
making, while avoiding that the target contemplates the decision too much, should be good 
persuasion mechanisms. After all, we showed that contemplation is likely to result in the 
decision to pursue one’s immediate self-interest in social dilemmas. Making the pro-
environmental cognitive content more salient will increase its weight in the heuristic decision 
process whether or not to behave ecologically.  
 
Limitations and future research 
 
Traditional economic theory assumes that when people make decisions, they engage in a 
kind of cost-benefit analysis of behavioral alternatives, and choose that course of action which 
yields them optimal personal utility. A major theme in this dissertation is the idea that, in 
contrast with this view, many of our decisions are made in a rather intuitive and automatic 
manner. Dual-process models of cognition (e.g., Bruner, 1986; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; e.g., 
Epstein, 1994; Wilson, 2002) have dealt with describing the characteristics of both systems of 
decision making. It is important to get insight in the exact process by which both systems 
work. That should allow us to develop persuasion strategies, which are fine-tuned to the 
specific (combination of) decision system in use. In Manuscript II and III, we showed that  
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manipulating a target’s self-perception with regard to environmental consciousness 
successfully increased environmentally friendly decision making. The type of decision tasks 
used as dependent variables in the studies included were of a low-involvement nature. It is a 
matter for future research to find out whether similar persuasion strategies would work in 
situations in which people are more involved with the judgment at hand, like the decision 
which new car or refrigerator to buy. Previous research suggests that might be the case. 
Bower (1981), for example, indicates that intuitive reactions influence which information is 
retrieved and how it is weighed in a more reasoned and elaborated decision process. On the 
other hand, perhaps a more reasoned decision process is insensitive to the subtle activation of 
this kind of cues and builds on a completely different set of information. 
 
As we indicated in the general discussion of Manuscript I, future research should also 
deal with investigating the outcomes associated with the use of each (combination) of both 
decision systems in social dilemma situations. In DGs, the automatic system anchors on 
implicit preferences for distributions of outcomes, measured by the ring measure of social 
values, whereas self-interested motivations dominate the reasoning process. In resource 
games, the dual process seems to work differently (Roch et al., 2000): The automatic system 
anchors decisions on an “equal-division” heuristic, whereas the reasoning system adjusts 
these choices in a self-serving direction. A third dual process determines the satisfaction felt in 
a situation of advantageous inequity (van den Bos et al., 2006). In these studies, participants 
were presented with either a equal distribution of money between themselves and another 
person, or with an unequal distribution, in which case they received more than the other 
person. In a situation of advantageous inequity, the automatic system showed to be 
essentially self-interested, resulting in judgments of high satisfaction. The reasoned system, 
on the other hand, takes fairness considerations into account, resulting in reporting lower 
satisfaction. In a study which is not included in this dissertation, we tried to replicate our DG 
findings in an applied setting, in which not money, but individual effort was the traded good. 
We asked participants to indicate how much time they were willing to devote to write letters in 
support of a charity organization. The results in this experiment revealed yet another way in 
which the automatic and the reasoned system respond to a dilemma situation. Compared to 
the judgments made by the automatic system, decisions made by the reasoned system were 
polarized according to participants’ SVO, showing that pro-socials were willing to spend more 
time and effort to benefit a charity organization, compared to pro-selfs. It remains a question 
for future research whether these different findings can be integrated into a single model of 
automatic versus reasoned decision making in interdependence situations, or whether both 




A matter of large practical importance, is the question whether subtle persuasion tools, 
like labeling and positive cueing are able to result in long term effects on behavior. In the 
studies reported in Manuscript II and III, the delay between our manipulation and the 
behavioral measures typically fluctuated between 10 and 30 minutes. Most models of 
persuasion (e.g., the Elaboration Likelihood Model) posit that, in order to achieve long-term 
effects on behavior, it is necessary to provoke some cognitive elaboration on the content of 
the message in order to change believes and evaluations regarding that topic. Techniques like 
labeling and positive cueing typically do not provoke such cognitive elaboration. In fact, they 
seem to work better if these cues are not attended actively (see Manuscript II), at least in the 
short term. Future research should point out whether such subtle manipulations of one’s self-
perception has lasting effects on behavior. Some research (e.g., Albarracín & Wyer, 2001) 
suggests this might be the case. These authors showed that people tend to rationalize their 
attitudes and behaviors by forming consistent beliefs. Therefore, by using tools like social 
labeling or positive cueing, which manipulate such attitudes by influencing the way one 
perceives his or her previous behavior, strong beliefs could develop. People may rationalize 
this perception by inferring that “they must be very concerned with the environment”. The 
influence of such beliefs could be more long lasting than the influence of communication 
arguments. This implies that even in the longer term, such subtle cues may have a superior 
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